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Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme
Court's Reliance on Commutation to
Ensure Justice in Death Penalty
Cases
Victoria J. Palacios 49 Vand. L. Rev. 311 (1996)
Despite unprecedented advances in constitutional protections for
criminal defendants by the Warren and Burger Courts, commutation is essen-
tial to achieving justice in administration of the death penalty. Wrongful or
unjust convictions and sentences, maldistribution of the death penalty, and
the growing belief that fair administration of capital punishment is an
impossible human enterprise give commutation continued importance.
Historically, the commutation power has been viewed as a fail-safe
measure against injustice. The Court and supreme court jurisprudence
reflects an abiding faith that commutation will respond to eliminate injustice,
particularly where the Court denies relief Instead, popular support for the
death penalty, concern over crime, and the erroneous belief that criminal
convictions are error-free have virtually eliminated the use of commutation.
By closing its eyes to the reality of commutation practices, the Court adds to
the growing evidence that it has abandoned its role as protector of the
powerless.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since scarcely a decade after Furman v. Georgia,' the Supreme
Court has struggled to avoid review of death penalty cases by narrow-
ing the grounds defendants can use to challenge their sentences, as
well as the procedures they can use to make those challenges. The
Court supports its jurisprudence and the deregulation of death with
an important but unexamined assumption: whatever shortcomings
exist in the administration of the death penalty, ultimately injustice
can and will be avoided by the exercise of the commutation power at
the state level.2 This Article argues that such an assumption is un-
warranted. By substituting the fantasy of commutation for meaning-
ful appellate review, the Court has perpetuated a system in which
capital convictions and sentences lack integrity, while capital defen-
dants suffer injustice.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The challenge in Furman was launched by a 26-year-old black
man with a sixth-grade education who was diagnosed as having some degree of mental defect.
He shot his victim through a closed door while attempting to enter the victim's home at night.
Id. at 252-53. Mr. Furman's eighth amendment challenge resulted in some 230 pages of sepa-
rate opinions. Per curiam, the Court held that the imposition and carrying out of the death
penalty in the cases before it constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 239-40. Five Justices-Douglas, White, Marshall,
Brennan, and Stewart-found the penalty to be per se unconstitutional. Justices Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, and Burger dissented.
2. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 868, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993). Public concern
about violent crime, see, for example, Bill Rankin and Sandra McIntosh, Georgians to Air Fears
of Violence in TV Town Meeting, Atlanta Journal-Constitution A4 (Jan. 5, 1994), and
overwhelming support for the death penalty play an important role in this jurisprudence.
Thomas B. Edsall, Death Penalty Opposition Seen as Impolitic in '92; Strong Public Backing
Frustrates Liberal Foes, Wash. Post A2 (April 22, 1992).
DEATH PENALTY COMMUTATION
The Supreme Court's commutation jurisprudence has led to
increased deregulation of death penalty decision making. It has dele-
gated those decisions to states that are politically unable to deliver
justice in death penalty cases. By doing so, the Court has abdicated
its role as protector of powerless minorities. It has also made the
imposition of a death penalty more likely. In eschewing constitutional
limits and relying on the political process, the Court has sanctioned a
process in which many people play a small role in death decisions, no
one takes sole, personal responsibility for the decision, and the final
decision makers are subject to strong political pressure.
Part II of this Article argues that, under current law, death
penalty convictions and sentences are unreliable. The system pro-
duces wrongful convictions and maldistribution because it is adminis-
tered unfairly at every level. Further, there is serious doubt that the
penalty can ever be administered fairly. Reduced access to habeas
corpus review makes these problems more difficult to correct. All of
these factors make commutation essential to achieving justice in the
capital punishment system. It is often the only mechanism available
to correct unjust results.
Part III examines the potential benefits of a meaningful com-
mutation process and proceeds to analyze the Supreme Court's com-
mutation cases. The Court clearly looks at commutation as if the
potential benefits were real and as if commutation actually corrects
injustices.
Part IV corrects the Supreme Court's rosy picture by looking at
commutation as it operates in reality. The fact is that the commuta-
tion power is virtually dead because of the belief that "super due
process"3 has virtually eliminated error and because the political
consequences of granting commutations are too great. The Article
uses a real commutation petition-that of William Andrews-to
demonstrate reality's failure to live up to the commutation ideal.
Part V explores the implications of the Court's death penalty
and commutation jurisprudence. The Court's view of commutation
advances the deregulation of death by delegating power to non-func-
tioning state commutation systems. Instead of providing meaningful
review, the Court fosters a bureaucratic process under which death
3. Tamar Lewin, Who Determines Who Will Die?: Even Within States, It Varies, N.Y.
Times B6 (Feb. 23, 1995). The use of the term "super due process" suggests an excessive degree
of care in assuring that procedures for determining guilt and imposing capital punishment are
fair. Paul D. Kamenar, Executive Legal Director of the Washington Legal Foundation, a
conservative law and policy group, suggests that laws protecting capital defendants have gone
"overboard" in making it difficult for prosecutors to obtain death sentences. Id.
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decisions cannot be attributed to any decision maker. By doing so, the
Court has failed to protect the powerless on death row.
This Article's focus is the commutation of death sentences. 4
"Commutation" is used to denote a reduction of a sentence to a lesser
one.5 In the capital punishment context, it means reducing a death
sentence to life imprisonment. "Clemency," on the other hand,
denotes "leniency or mercy in the exercise of authority or power."6
Commutation is a more limited form of clemency7 but shares many
attributes of its parent power.8 The terms "commutation" and
"clemency" are used interchangeably in this Article to mean a reduc-
tion of sentence, unless otherwise noted.
II. THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF DEATH PENALTY COMMUTATION
Despite improved crime detection technology and due process
protection afforded to criminal defendants, 9 evidence of wrongful
convictions unfolds with disturbing frequency. Soon after the
Supreme Court reinstated the constitutionality of the death penalty,
it stated that because of the qualitative difference between imprison-
ment and death, there is a "corresponding difference in the need for
4. Commutation of other kinds of sentences is outside the scope of this Article; however,
commutation of non-death sentences is becoming increasingly important because of the strain
that mandatory and determinate sentencing is placing on the control of prison populations.
Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69
Tex. L. Rev. 569, 611-13 (1991). On a purely practical level, commutation of prison sentences
may be the last resort to deal with two unpleasant realities: aging, infirm, no-longer-dangerous
offenders and prison crowding. Derral Cheatwood, The Life-Without-Parole Sanction: Its
Current Status and a Research Agenda, 34 Crime & Delinq. 43, 50 (1988). See generally Susan
Martin, Commutation of Prison Sentences: Practice, Promise, and Limitation, 29 Crime &
Delinq. 593 (1983) (examining state commutation practices).
5. Elkan Abramowitz and David Paget, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 136, 138 (1964); U.S. Dept. of Justice, 3 The Attorney General's Survey of Release
Procedures 209 (1939) ("DOJ Survey").
6. Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 575 (cited in note 4). See Michael L. Radelet and Barbara A.
Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. Richmond L. Rev. 289, 289-
90 (1993) (defining clemency as a broad power resting in the executive branch of government,
consisting of pardons (invalidating both guilt and punishment), reprieves (temporarily
postponing punishment), and commutations (reducing the severity of the punishment)).
7. Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 577 (cited in note 4).
8. Other types of clemency include pardoning, which is the forgiveness of moral guilt and
dispensation of punishment for an offense, and amnesty, which does not forgive a crime but
causes it to be overlooked in the best interests of society. Id. at 576. Amnesty is usually
granted to groups of people. Id.
9. Some maintain that our criminal justice system "can boast of more elaborate mecha-
nisms to protect defendants than any other system in the world." Arye Rattner, Convicted but




reliability1 ° in the determination that death is the appropriate pun-
ishment in a specific case."' " Notwithstanding efforts to ameliorate
arbitrariness and to provide juries with sufficient guidance to impose
death sentences evenhandedly, it remains as true today as it was
when Furman v. Georgia12 was decided that a poor African-American
tried for the capital murder of a white victim in the South is far more
likely to be sentenced to death than is his middle-class, Northern
counterpart whose victim was black, regardless of the aggravating or
mitigating factors present in each case.13 In what has been described
as a "rush to judgment," members of the Supreme Court, notably
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, have vowed to expedite
the imposition of death penalties by, among other things, curtailing
habeas corpus review. 14 The emergence of the death penalty as a cam-
paign issue and abundant public support for capital punishment
create an atmosphere that subordinates reliability and fairness to
political posturing and expedience. The combination of these forces
makes it increasingly difficult for a condemned inmate to correct
problems that survive post-conviction review.
A. Wrongful Convictions
Commutation should remain a vital component of American
criminal justice because errors occur at every point in the conviction
and sentencing process. 5 These errors are simply part of the risk
10. "Reliability" is that quality which makes the outcome of the criminal justice system
trustworthy. See Black's Law Dictionary 1291 (West, 6th ed. 1990). If a conviction and a
sentence are reliable, they are demonstrably sound and we can depend on them as bases for
carrying out sanctions. The Supreme Court has insisted that the death penalty be imposed
"fairly and with reasonable consistency or not at all." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112
(1982).
11. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). The language quoted is the
genesis for the term "heightened reliability" which has become a term of art in death penalty
jurisprudence. See, for example, Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (1994)
(Souter, J., concurring, joined by Stevens, J.) (arguing that the state, having raised the issue of
future dangerousness, erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the alternative sentence of life
carried no possibility of parole).
12. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
13. See generally Brent E. Newton, A Case Study in System Unfairness: The Texas Death
Penalty, 1973-1994, 1 Tex. Forum on C.L. & C.R. 1 (1994).
14. See generally Hon. Paul H. Roney, Comments in Support of the Powell Committee
Recommendations, 19 Capital U. L. Rev. 649 (1990) (supporting the adoption of
recommendations made by the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases
for improving the appeals process in capital cases).
15. Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 530, 530 (1989). See Newton, 1 Tex. Forum on C.L. & C.R. at 34 (cited in note 13).
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that attends living in a democracy.16  When errors lead to the
conviction of innocent defendants, these cases are designated as
wrongful convictions or false positives. It is impossible to eliminate
the false positives from the criminal justice system. A system that
never caught any innocent people would probably catch few guilty
ones.17 Wrongful convictions occur, of course, in capital cases as
well,18 but imposition of a death sentence removes all opportunity to
correct a miscarriage of justice. This fact warrants the often repeated
statement, "Death is different."' 9
Various studies have attempted to estimate the frequency of
wrongful convictions,20 but they have revealed no method of accurately
measuring this phenomenon. 2' Nonetheless, the literature makes it
"unmistakably clear" that some innocent people are or have been on
death row.2 2 A study by C. Ronald Huff, Arye Rattner, and Edward
Sagarin defines a wrongfully convicted person as one who is subse-
quently found factually innocent.23 They devised a formula for esti-
mating wrongful convictions.24 Applying their formula to 1993 data,
16. "Our system does not guarantee either the conviction of the guilty or the acquittal of
the innocent.... [All that our system guarantees is a fair trial. It is a price which every
member of a civilized community must pay for the erection and maintenance of machinery for
administering justice, that he may become the victim of its imperfect functioning." Rattner, 12
L. & Human Beh. at 283 (cited in note 9) (citing G. Louis Joughin and Edmund M. Morgan, The
Legacy of Sacco and Vanzetti 183-84 (Harcourt Brace, 1948)). See generally Jerome Frank and
Barbara Frank, Not Guilty (Victor Gollancz, 1957), for a general account of 34 cases of persons
who were convicted of crimes they did not commit.
17. Rattner, 12 L. & Human Beh. at 291 (cited in note 9).
18. See generally Charles L. Black, Jr., Capital Punishment: The Inevitability of Caprice
and Mistake (Norton, 2d ed. 1981).
19. Id. at 39.
20. See generally C. Ronald Huff, Arye Rattner, and Edward Sagarin, Guilty Until Proved
Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 32 Crime & Delinq. 518 (1986); Hugo Adam
Bedau and Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L.
Rev. 21 (1987); Rattner, 12 L. & Human Beh. at 284 (cited in note 9).
21. Rattner, 12 L. & Human Beh. at 284 (cited in note 9).
22. Ronald J. Tabak and J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-
Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 Loyola LA. L. Rev. 59, 98 (1989). A study by the
Death Penalty Information Center indicates that 58% of people surveyed expressed concern over
the prospect of executing the innocent. Jason Berry, Is Justice Forgiving?; Governors Shy Away
from Death Row Pardons, Dallas Morn. News 1J (Aug. 15, 1993). See James C. Harrington,
Executing the Innocent By Supreme Court Order, Tex. Lawyer 13 (Feb. 8, 1993).
23. Huff, Rattner, and Sagarin, 32 Crime & Delinq. at 519 (cited in note 20).
24. The researchers "confidently estimate" that less than one percent of convictions are
wrongful. This figure is based on an anonymous survey by the researchers of more than 350
federal and state judges and prosecutors, as well as state public defenders and law enforcement,
soliciting their estimates of the magnitude of wrongful convictions. Id. at 520-23. They also
discuss Radin's unnamed, "highly respected judge" who reported an estimated 5% wrongful
convictions in his experience. Id. at 520-21 (citing Edward D. Radin, The Innocents (Welman
Monroe, 1964)). They note that conviction rates for serious crimes range between one-half and
three-quarters of arrests, and elect to use a conservative conviction rate of 50%. Their method
of arriving at the number of wrongful convictions can be summarized by the following formula:
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Huff, Rattner, and Sagarin estimated that of the 22,510 arrests made
for murder and non-negligent manslaughter,25 fifty-six were
wrongfully convicted. Some of those innocent people may have been
sentenced to death.
The reasons errors of justice take place are disconcerting. Huff
and his associates believe that these wrongful convictions are
attributable to eyewitness mistake,26 errors or misconduct by police
and prosecutors, plea bargaining,27 community pressure for a
conviction, inadequacy of counsel, false accusations, and the fact
finder's knowledge of the defendant's criminal record.28 According to a
survey conducted by Rattner, major sources of error in wrongful
convictions were eyewitness misidentification, police and
prosecutorial zeal and bad faith, community pressure for conviction,
false accusation, and plea bargaining.29
There are additional reasons for doubting the reliability of
criminal convictions. Investigation and prosecution of criminal activ-
ity rely increasingly on new scientific methods, interpreted by experts
who often cannot agree on the methods employed or the conclusions
(A x C) x R = Y. See id. at 523. A represents the number of arrests for murder and non-
negligent manslaughter. C is the rate of conviction, .5, and R is the rate of wrongful conviction,
.005, and Yis the number of people who were wrongfully convicted in that period.
25. Kathleen Maguire and Ann L. Pastore, eds., Sourcebook Of Criminal Justice Statistics
1993 at 418 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1994) ("Sourcebook").
26. Mistaken eyewitness identification due to the influence of improper suggestion is a
major cause of miscarriages of justice. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1967)
(citing Patrick M. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 26 (Charles C. Thomas,
1965)). Nevertheless, criticism has been leveled that eyewitness identification is accepted
"uncritical[ly]" in the legal system. Frederick E. Chemay, Comment, Unreliable Eyewitness
Evidence: The Expert Psychologist and the Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 La. L. Rev. 721, 729
(1985) (quoting Robert Buckhout, Eyewitness Identification and Psychology in the Courtrooom,
Crim. Defense 3 (Sept.-Oct. 1977)).
27. See W. Larry Gregory, John C. Mowen, and Darwyn E. Linder, Social Psychology of
Plea Bargaining: Applications, Methodology, and Theory, 36 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 1521,
1521-25 (1978) (concluding that data suggests that the "use of both overcharging and
announcing an intent to seek the maximum penalty might increase the number of innocent
defendants who plea bargain").
28. Huff, Rattner, and Sagarin, 32 Crime & Delinq. at 524-33 (cited in note 20).
29. Rattner, 12 L. & Human Beh. at 285-86 (cited in note 9). In another study of wrongful
convictions by researchers Ronald J. Tabak and J. Mark Lane, the catalogue of circumstances
that result in wrongful convictions is daunting- "[T]he prosecution had knowingly withheld
evidence;" "the blood type of the sperm... differed from [the defendant's];" "new evidence
proved [the defendant's] alibi to be true;" "peijured testimony [was] given under police
pressure;" "five witnesses testified that [another] had confessed to the crime;" "[the defendant's]
alibi was proven to be true, and... his conviction had rested on pejured testimony;" "the
prosecutor... finally came forward and revealed that the state's key witness had told him that
[another] had killed the victim;" "pubic hairs and semen samples taken from the scene did not
match [the defendant's];" and "the prosecutors had withheld evidence which would have led to
an acquittal." Tabak and Lane, 23 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. at 99-105 (cited in note 22).
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reached. 30 The use of scientific evidence presents hazards that can
lead to erroneous convictions. Experts can and have given misleading
and inaccurate testimony with very little opportunity for attorneys or
the jury to detect the deception. 31 In the controversy over the
standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in the federal
courts, the Supreme Court recently held that Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence 32 superseded the general acceptance test enunciated
in Frye v. United States.3 3 This holding will expand the use of
scientific expert testimony in future federal cases.34 Though not
binding on the states, the decision may affect state rules.35 Advances
in the art of jury influence and manipulation also contribute to
erroneous convictions.36 Skillful use of peremptory challenges based
on advice from jury experts may determine the outcome of a criminal
trial and may ultimately undermine the reliability of the verdict, as
well as public confidence in the jury system.37 Though one might
expect that super due process would reduce the incidence of wrongful
convictions in capital cases, mistakes are perpetuated with some
frequency because of plea bargaining, police misconduct, and the poor
quality of counsel.
Wrongful convictions include not only those that are inaccu-
rate, but also those that are inequitable. For example, plea
bargaining for a co-defendant's testimony can lead to the conviction of
30. See generally Vicki S. Menard, Comment, Admission of Computer Generated Visual
Evidence: Should There Be Clear Standards?, 6 Software L. J. 325 (1993).
31. Dr. James P. Grigson, a psychiatrist known as Dr. Death, is noted for his ability to
persuade jurors that a defendant he may never have examined is going to commit another
offense as a matter of medical certainty. Ron Rosenbaum, Travels with Dr. Death and Other
Unusual Investigations 210 (Penguin, 1991). For a list of cases in which Dr. Grigson has so
testified, see Schneider v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 1988).
32. F.R.E. 702 (If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise").
33. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993).
34. In Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923), it had been held that expert
testimony was inadmissible unless it was based on a scientific technique "generally accepted" as
reliable in the scientific community. In Daubert, the Court liberalized the standard. The Court
held that expert testimony is admissible under F.R.E. 702 if scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in
determining the facts at issue. 113 S. Ct. at 2794-96.
35. Many states model their rules of evidence on the Federal Rules. See, for example,
State v. Streich, 658 A.2d 38, 46 (Vt. 1995).
36. See generally Frederick L. Brown, Frank T. McGuire, and Mary S. Winters, The
Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse,
14 New England L. Rev. 192 (1978); Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Reliance on
Bias and Prejudice, 8 Georgetown J. L. Ethics 1 (1994).
37. See Simpson Jury: 'Media Pollution," L.A. Times B6 (Oct. 10, 1994).
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an innocent or less culpable person. To induce a co-defendant to
testify against his partner, the prosecutor may offer a reduced
sentence or not ask for the death penalty in a capital case. If the
more culpable party agrees to testify, the result is that the defendant
who is less blameworthy receives the greater sentence. 38
Police misconduct accounts for a number of wrongful convic-
tions. While Brady v. Maryland39 condemns the prosecution's
suppression of exculpatory evidence requested by the defendant, the
rule in that decision does not protect the defendant from deceptive
police reports.40 In fact, the discretion of the police to fail to report
exculpatory evidence has not been subjected to the same scrutiny as
the prosecutor's duty to disclose such evidence. 41 The potential to
mislead is limited only by the imagination of the officer wishing to do
so. Police reports may deliberately mislead by failing to collect or
record evidence, failing to pursue leads, or by fabricating evidence. 42
Even a direct request for police reports may not result in full
disclosure. Some police departments employ a dual filing system.
The official file is produced in response to a subpoena, but the
unofficial file (sometimes called a "street file") is not.43 Finally, the
problem of police deception is exacerbated by the fact that the police
have substantial disincentives to report exculpatory facts."
The poor quality of legal representation given to indigents at
state trials and sentencing hearings, particularly in the South, ac-
counts for some wrongful convictions and inappropriate death sen-
tences. Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun is convinced that
"the principal failings of the capital punishment review process today
are the inadequacy and inadequate compensation of counsel at trial
38. See Steven M. Sprenger, Note, A Critical Evaluation of State Supreme Court
Proportionality Review in Death Sentence Cases, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 719, 736 (1988). See generally
Jamie Marie Billotte, Is It Justified?-The Death Penalty and Mental Retardation, 8 Notre
Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol. 333 (1994).
39. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
40. Id. at 87.
41. Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts, Ma'am'" Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory
Evidence in Police Reports, 28 New England L. Rev. 1, 5 (1993).
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id. at 36-37.
44. Id. at 9. Various reasons have been noted for police officers' lying and deception: (1) to
satisfy bureaucratic regulations, (2) to protect themselves and fellow officers, (3) to convince the
public that the department is "doing something" about crime, and (4) to promote values (for
example, maintaining order and punishing offenders) that they perceive to be superior to truth-
telling. Id. at 12-17.
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and the unavailability of counsel in state post-conviction proceed-
ings."45
The National Law Journal conducted a six-month, six-state
study of defenses of capital murders that resulted in some alarming
revelations. 46 The study disclosed that whether a defendant is sen-
tenced to death depends more on his attorney than his crime.47 Trial
lawyers who represented capital defendants in the "Death Belt0 8 have
been disbarred or disciplined at a rate three to forty-six times the
overall discipline rate for the same state.49 Too often attorneys in the
Death Belt try a capital case in one or two days, whereas lawyers in
other parts of the country where sophisticated indigent defense
systems exist would spend two weeks to two months.5° Death Belt
lawyers make little effort to present mitigating evidence-in one case,
the penalty phase lasted only fifteen minutes .5  The few states that
have standards for appointed counsel in capital cases tolerate
frequent violations of those standards.52 Furthermore, other studies
reveal that one-third of the convicts on the nation's death rows have
no representation for their appeals.53
The impact of errors inherent in the criminal justice system is
amplified and ratified by other factors. Some suspect that public
45. McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2785 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty
Cases: A Report Containing the American Bar Association's Recommendations Concerning
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus and Related Materials from the American Bar Association
Criminal Justice Section's Project on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 16
(1990)).
46. Marcia Coyle, Fred Strasser, and Marianne Lavelle, Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in
the Nation's Death Belt, Natl. L. J. 30, 30-44 (June 11, 1990).
47. Id. at 30.
48. This term has been used to denote the six to nine Southern states that account for the
vast majority of this nation's executions. The states include Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. See Note, The
Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
1923, 1924 (1994); Coyle, Strasser, and Lavelle, Natl. L. J. at 30 (cited in note 46).
49. Coyle, Strasser, and Lavelle, Natl. L. J. at 44 (cited in note 46).
50. Id. at 30.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Sam Howe Verhovek, Executions Are Neither Swift Nor Cheap, N.Y. Times Al (Feb.
22, 1995). Sister Helen Prejean, an advocate for condemned prisoners, testified before the
Louisiana Parole Board to urge the commutation of the death sentence of Robert Willie. She
said, "[Ilf we are honest, we must admit that ... there are two systems of justice-one for the
rich, who can afford expert counsel, and one for people like Robert Willie-and that is why only
poor people will ever appear before this board." Sister Prejean, C.S.J., Dead Man Walking: An
Eyewitness Account of the Death Penalty in the United States 166 (Vintage, 1993). Ohio
Governor Michael V. DiSalle has also noted that the disadvantaged are disproportionately
represented among petitioners for clemency. Michael V. DiSalle, Comments on Capital
Punishment and Clemency, 25 Ohio St. L. J. 71, 72 (1964).
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opinion and the fear of crime raise our tolerance for wrongful convic-
tions.54 Furthermore, it is likely that as a case reaches higher levels
of review, there is less chance that an error will be discovered and
corrected.55 This ratification of error has led one commentator to
describe our criminal justice system with the metaphor of a manufac-
turing line without quality control.56
B. Death Penalty Administration Is Not Fair
In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court declared that the
manner in which the death penalty had been imposed in prior cases
was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.57  Since the
Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment in 1976,58 its death
penalty jurisprudence suggests that the Court has concluded that
death penalty practice is free from unconstitutional race dis-
crimination and arbitrariness. 59 Social scientists conducting research
in this area have declared that it is not.60 The continuing unfair dis-
tribution of the death sentence belies the Court's claim that post-
Furman death penalty practice is no longer arbitrary and capricious.
In fact, the composition of our death row population today-especially
54. Rattner, 12 L. & Human Beh. at 291-92 (cited in note 9).
55. Id. at 292.
56. Hebert L. Packer, The Limits Of The Criminal Sanction 159-60, 292 (Stanford U.,
1968).
57. "[T]hese discretionary statutes... are pregnant with discrimination and discrimina-
tion is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit
in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments." 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). "I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate
the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). "In my judgment
what was done in these cases violated the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 314 (White, J., concur-
ring). Justices Brennan and Marshall found that the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment in all cases. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
58. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
59. See Jonathan Sorensen and James W. Marquart, Prosecutorial and Jury Decision-
Making in Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 743, 746 &
nn.26-30 (1990-91) (citing cases in which the Supreme Court upheld statutes guiding the
discretion ofjurors in imposing the death penalty). See also Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892,
915-16 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a discussion regarding the impact of Peny v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), Justice Stevens referred to the "progress we have made in
eliminating racial discrimination and other arbitrary considerations from the capital sentencing
determination." Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 915 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. See, for example, Sorensen and Marquardt, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 751-56
(cited in note 59) (arguing that a Texas capital punishment statute is racially discriminatory
and arbitrary, and citing numerous studies supporting that finding).
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that of the nation's leader in executions, Texas6t-.is not very different
from the pre-Furman population. 62
The race of the offender is sometimes a factor in this maldis-
tribution. Minority offenders may not be tried before a fair jury if
members of their group are excluded from juries and from jury
venires.6 Race discrimination in jury selection is unconstitutional, 64
but such discrimination is difficult to prove. 5 Furthermore, the rules
against race discrimination in jury selection are of relatively recent
origin. For example, many of the Hispanics and African-Americans
on death row in Texas were convicted in Dallas County during a
period in which the manual for prosecutors read:
You are not looking for a fair juror, but rather a strong, biased and sometimes
hypocritical individual who believes that Defendants are different from them
in kind, rather than degree.... You are not looking for any member of a
minority group which may subject him to suppression-they almost always
empathize with the accused.... Minority races almost always empathize with
the Defendant.... Jewish veniremen generally make poor State's jurors.
Jews have a history of oppression and generally empathize with the accused.
66
At the trial of James Russell in Fort Bend County, Texas, the prose-
cutor referred to an African-American adult male as a "boy" and used
the phrase "you people" in reference to blacks.67
The death penalty is not evenly applied to offenders of differ-
ent races, and "this inequity has made the need for mercy all the more
61. Newton, 1 Tex. Forum on C.L. & C.R. at 3 (cited in note 13).
62. Id. at 31.
63. In Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), Justice O'Connor wrote:
It is by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors
perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determin-
ing the verdict of guilt or innocence.
Id. at 68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64. In cases spanning over a hundred years, the Court has condemned such discrimina-
tion. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (holding that the state's exclusion of
Negroes from juries violated the Equal Protection Clause); McCollum, 505 U.S. at 55 (holding
that a criminal defendant cannot engage in race discrimination in exercising peremptory
challenges).
65. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor wrote:
The ability to use peremptory challenges to exclude majority race jurors may be crucial
to impaneling a fair jury. In many cases an African-American, or other minority defen-
dant, may be faced with a jury array in which his racial group is underrepresented to
some degree, but not sufficiently to permit challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The only possible chance the defendant may have of having any minority jurors on the
jury that actually tries him will be if he uses his peremiptories to strike members of the
majority race.
Id. (quoting Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae 9-10).
66. Newton, 1 Tex. Forum on C.L. & C.R. at 14 (cited in note 13) (quoting from Dallas
County Prosecution Manual: Jury Selection in Criminal Cases).
67. Id. at 15.
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acute.68 Since the Supreme Court held in McCleskey v. Kemp 69 that
evidence of structural racial disparity does not invalidate capital
sentences, however, it appears that the discretion to grant relief from
systemic racial discrimination lies with a sentencing authority inde-
pendent of the court system.70
Maldistribution based on the race of the victim is even more
striking. On the national level, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund indi-
cates that only three white people have been executed for killing a
black victim since executions resumed in 1977.71 The United States
Accounting Office validated statistical studies finding that a defen-
dant is more likely to receive the death penalty if the victim is white
than if the victim is black.72 Reporters at the Dallas Times Herald
conducted a nationwide study and concluded that in the states where
the death penalty has been imposed, defendants with white victims
are almost three times more likely to be sentenced to death than
defendants with black victims. 73  The study revealed that in
Maryland, defendants with white victims were eight times more likely
to receive the death penalty than defendants with black victims; in
Arkansas, the defendant was six times more likely; and in Texas, the
defendant was five times more likely.74  A later study found
significant disparities in sentencing relating to the victim's race in
Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Oklahoma, North Carolina, and
Mississippi. 75 This study indicated that the likelihood that
defendants with white victims would be executed was almost ten
68. Paul Whitlock Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment,
99 Yale L. J. 389,403 (1989).
69. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
70. Cobb, 99 Yale L. J. at 403 (cited in note 68).
71. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A.: Reporter 773,
775 (William S. Hein, 1995) ("Death Row Reporter").
72. Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant?: Or Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing
Act Be Enacted to Substantially Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing? 18
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 777, 778 (1990-91) (citing U.S. General Accounting Office, Death
Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities (1990), reprinted in 136
Cong. Rec. S6889-90 (May 24, 1990)).
73. Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of
the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 797, 826 (1986) (citing Jim
Henderson and Jack Taylor, Killers of Dallas Blacks Escape Death Penalty, Dallas Times Herald
1 (Nov. 17, 1986)).
74. Tabak, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 780-81 n.10 (cited in note 72). Another
study by Jonathan Sorensen and James Marquart agrees that a person who is accused of the
capital murder of a white victim in Texas is more than five times more likely to be convicted
than one who is accused of killing an African-American. Sorensen and Marquart, 18 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 771 (cited in note 59).
75. Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro, Death and Discrimination: Racial Disparities in
Capital Sentencing, 43-87, 88-94 (Northeastern U., 1989).
19961 323
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
times greater in Georgia, nearly eight times greater in Florida, and
about six times greater in Illinois than if the defendant's victims were
black.76 The data, nationwide or state-by-state, yields consistent con-
clusions that the race of the victim is a significant factor in determin-
ing the likelihood that a defendant will be sentenced to death.
Maldistribution also results from economic status,77 member-
ship in other vulnerable groups, and geography. Studies have re-
ported "harsher treatment of persons with fewer resources. ''78 Even in
systems redesigned to promote equal treatment, socioeconomic bias
remains, though in a more subtle form.7 9 The mentally impaired and
juveniles are among the more vulnerable groups represented on death
row.80 One observer estimates that as many as half of the inmates on
death row in Texas have "significant histories of mental illness or
brain damage."81 The same writer reports that one hundred teens
have been sentenced to death in Texas alone in the past twenty
years.82 Geographical maldistribution results from differences among
death penalty states, as well as from differences between states that
have the death penalty and those that do not. Offenders in the second
group of states never have to worry about facing the death penalty,
although their crimes may be death-eligible elsewhere.
Finally, one would hope that this most terrible of punishments
would be assigned only to the worst offenders. Yet there is no basis
for the assumption that those who commit the most heinous murders
are sentenced to death s3 Nor are those condemned to die more likely
to pose a risk to public safety.84
76. Id. at 44. Regression analysis resulted in somewhat lower, but still highly signficant,
figures. The likelihood that defendants with white victims would be executed was seven times
greater in Georgia, five times greater in Florida, and four times greater in Illinois. Id. at 69.
77. See generally Jeffrey Reiman, The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison
(Macmillan, 3rd ed. 1990).
78. Martha A. Myers, Economic Inequality and Discrimination in Sentencing, 65 Social
Forces 746, 761 (1987).
79. Terance D. Miethe and Charles A. Moore, Socioeconomic Disparities Under
Determinate Sentencing Systems: A Comparison of Preguideline and Postguideline Practices in
Minnesota, 23 Criminology 337, 358 (1985). For example, the quality of appointed counsel may
be improved, but a characteristically uneducated, indigent client would still be limited in his
ability to understand and assert his defense. Id.
80. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (concluding that the execution of
juvenile offenders does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment); Penry, 492 U.S. at 340 (ruling that the Eighth Amendment does not bar per se the
execution of mentally retarded offenders).
81. Newton, 1 Tex. Forum on C.L. & C.R. at 29 (cited in note 13).
82. Id. at 30-31.
83. Tabak and Lane, 23 Loyola LA. L. Rev. at 62 (cited in note 22).
84. James W. Marquart and Jonathan R. Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-
Commuted Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, 23 Loyola LA L.
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C. Death Penalty Administration Can Never Be Fair
The previous Section outlined ways in which the distribution of
death sentences is unfair. While it is possible that maldistribution is
a temporary, remediable phenomenon, there is growing evidence that
the death penalty can never be administered fairly.85 One indicator of
this characteristic unfairness is the fact that the Supreme Court's
decisions in death penalty cases typically lack solidarity. The Court
was badly fragmented in Furman and has commonly decided capital
cases in five-to-four opinions.16 Over time, some justices have been
consistent in their denunciation of the death penalty,87 while others
have been adamant in their defense of it.88 Those with moderate
views have borne the burden of delineating the parameters of a
constitutional death penalty regime. Recently two of these moderate
justices have questioned their own rationale in previous capital
punishment cases.
In a nondescript Texas case, Callins v. Collins,89 Justice Harry
Blackmun culminated a two-decade struggle with death penalty ju-
risprudence by explicitly abandoning what he now sees as a futile
effort to administer capital punishment fairly. Justice Blackmun's
journey began with his dissent in Furman when he wrote, 'I yield to
no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed,
abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects of physical
distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite minds."90
Despite his misgivings at that time, he could not find the death
Rev. 5, 27-28 (1989) (reporting that a study of Furman-commuted inmates indicates over-pre-
diction of future dangerousness for that group).
85. The doubt regarding the ability of finite humans to make capital punishment judg-
ments has been part of death penalty discourse for a long time. On this point, Justice Marshall
once wrote, "The [state] court's inability to administer its capital punishment statute in an
evenhanded fashion is.... I believe, symptomatic of a deeper problem that is proving to be
intractable." Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 441 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by
Brennan, J.).
86. See, for example, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137 (1987); Penry, 492 U.S. at 302; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361.
87. See, for example, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600-01 (1977) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring); Eddings u. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring); Tison, 481 U.S.
at 185 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1027 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). See generally Alan I. Bigel, Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood
Marshall on Capital Punishment: Its Constitutionality, Morality, Deterrent Effect, and
Interpretation by the Court, 8 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol. 11 (1994).
88. See, for example, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 308-09 (1976) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1127, 127 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
89. 114 S. Ct. 1127, 127 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1994).
90. 408 U.S. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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penalty unconstitutional. Justice Blackmun subsequently voted to
uphold the constitutionality of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia9'
because he believed the matter to be within the purview of state
legislatures92 and because at that time the Supreme Court was
exercising oversight of state capital practices.93
Today Justice Blackmun is convinced that the mandate of
Furman remains correct, but that "[d]elivering on the Furman prom-
ise" turned out to be hopeless.94 He maintains that "[e]xperience has
shown that the consistency and rationality promised in Furman are
inversely related to the fairness owed the individual when considering
a sentence of death. A step toward consistency is a step away from
fairness."95 Despite attempts by courts and legislatures to devise
substantive and procedural rules to meet the "daunting challenge" of
Furman, capital practice "remains fraught with arbitrariness, dis-
crimination, caprice, and mistake."96 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun
notes that race "continues to play a major role 7 in death penalty
decisions. Nevertheless, he notes that the Supreme Court appears to
have chosen to "deregulate the entire enterprise" and abdicate its
important role in death penalty jurisprudence.98 He concludes:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of
death.... Rather than continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired
level of fairness has been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I
feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death pen-
alty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me now that no com-
bination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death
penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies.99
Reactions to Justice Blackmun's change of position have been
mixed. 0 0 It has been dismissed by Justice Scalia as the product of
"intellectual, moral and personal perceptions," rather than stemming
91. 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976).
92. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 410-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. See Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Part II.C.
94. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1131 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1132 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1129 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1135 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1129 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. See, for example, Bruce Fein, What Benchmarks for the Next Justice?, Wash. Times
A16 (April 11, 1994) (speculating on Justice Blackmun's replacement, and criticizing his "anti-
death penalty views operatically voiced in Callins v. Collins"); Nat Hentoff, "I Shall Not Tinker
with the Machinery of Death," Village Voice 22 (Jan. 24, 1995) (noting that, if the official killing
ever stops, Justice Blackmun's views will have provided grist for the mill).
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from an interpretation of the "text and tradition of the
Constitution."101
Months after Justice Blackmun's conversion, it was reported
that Justice Lewis F. Powell had had a similar change of heart. In a
1991 interview, Justice Powell was asked if he would change any of
his votes if he could.102 He answered in the affirmative and cited
McCleskey v. Kemp, 0 3 which upheld Georgia's death penalty against a
broad-based race discrimination attack and launched a spate of con-
troversy. Some heralded McCleskey as the savior of the death pen-
alty, 04 while others condemned it for preserving extant racism.10°
These characterizations accurately reflect the importance of
McCleskey in death penalty jurisprudence.106
The story of how Justice Powell came to regret his support of
the death penalty began over twenty years ago. At the start of his
death penalty jurisprudence, Justice Powell objected to the death
penalty's emergence as a constitutional issue. °7 In 1976, he accepted
that the task of the Court was to craft a new death penalty practice to
meet the objections voiced in Furman.05 While he realized that a
perfect system was not attainable, at least in the beginning, he be-
lieved that it was enough to require the capital punishment system to
be as nearly perfect as possible.19 Though described as a centrist,
Justice Powell agreed with the result in capital cases more often than
other justices during his tenure on the Court."0
When McCleskey petitioned for certiorari, Justice Powell ob-
jected to hearing the case. He was unfamiliar with statistical analy-
sis. He did not know what constitutional weight should be given to
101. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1127 (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Justice Blackmim's
response in McCollum v. North Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2784, 2784-85, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (responding to Justice Scalia's challenge, he argues that the death
penalty is inappropriate for Henry Lee "Buddy" McCollum because of mental retardation).
102. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 451 (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994).
103. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
104. See, for example, George F. Will, The Death Penalty by One Vote, Wash. Post A19
(April 30, 1987); Death Penalty, Miami Herald 2C (April 26, 1987).
105. See, for example, Hugo Adam Bedau, Someday McCleskey will be Death Penalty's
Dred Scott, L. Times 5 (May 1, 1987); Anthony Lewis, Racism: A Matter of Life and Death,
Detroit Free Press 11A (April 29, 1987); Punishment Still Capricious, Boston Globe 16 (April 24,
1987).
106. The entire course of death penalty jurisprudence may have been changed had Justice
Powell joined the four dissenters in McCleskey. Mark A. Graber, Judicial Recantation, 45
Syracuse L. Rev. 807, 807 (1994) ("Had Justice Powell seen the light while on the bench, the
Supreme Court would have dealt a crippling blow to the death penalty in McClesky'.
107. Jeffries, Powell at 453 (cited in note 102).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 442.
110. Id. at 435.
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the statistical impact of the victim's race and thought the data
supported rather than condemned Georgia's system.,,, As it turned
out, Justice Powell cast the fifth vote upholding Georgia's statute and
wrote the opinion of the Court. He wrote that the statistical evidence
presented in the Baldus study"2  did not "demonstrate a
constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia
capital-sentencing process.""' Four years later, Justice Powell would
tell his former clerk and biographer John C. Jeffries, Jr., that he
regretted his vote in this case and said, "I would [now] vote the other
way in any capital case."" 4 Jeffries surmises that Justice Powell
abandoned his belief that the death penalty could be fairly
administered because the new system turned out to be fraught with
opportunities for litigation and because delay became the primary
objective of capital punishment advocacy."n
The most telling aspect of these twin sagas is that, at the out-
set, both Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell had faith in the
Court's ability to fashion a system that was constitutionally accept-
able, though imperfect. After assiduously applying themselves to the
task for over two decades, each concluded that it is not within the
finite abilities of human beings to make these judgments fairly and
that it is better to forsake the effort than to continue to pretend oth-
erwise. Justices Blackmun and Powell are not alone in this view-
point. Arthur England, former chief justice of the Florida Supreme
Court, now believes that the rationality and consistency required of
capital punishment was actually a chimera. He concludes, "I thought
the Supreme Court of Florida would be able to set standards that
made sense that we could enforce.... My experience... was that it's
impossible to set standards and adhere to them.""16
It is pointless to speculate about how the latter-day views of
Justices Blackmun and Powell might have changed the force of
Furman,17 but this much is certain: the constitutionality of the death
111. Id. at 439.
112. This study was conducted by Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George
Woodworth. It is comprised of two statistical studies of over 2,000 murder cases in Georgia
during the 1970s. McCleskey argued that the study demonstrated a "disparity in the imposition
of the death sentence in Georgia based on the race of the murder victim and, to a lesser extent,
the race of the defendant." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
113. Id. at 313.
114. Jeffries, Powell at 451 (cited in note 102).
115. Id. at 442-43.
116. David von Drehle, When Harry Met Scalia: Why the Death Penalty is Dying, Wash.
Post C3 (March 6, 1994).
117. The changes of opinion by the two justices, particularly Justice Blackmun, have
generated significant comment. See generally Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to
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penalty and the many nuances of its jurisprudence rest to a great
extent on the opinions of two justices who have since changed their
minds. It has been pointed out that "decisions rendered by the
Justices of the Supreme Court have a very special moral meaning."118
Others have observed that the Court's power rests in part on "moral
suasion.119 The disclosures by Justices Blackmun and Powell have
seriously undercut the moral legitimacy of the death penalty and
leave us facing the prospect that the entire death penalty enterprise
is unworkable. 120
D. Habeas Corpus Review
Curtailing habeas corpus review reduces opportunities to
remedy wrongful convictions and other injustices. At one time some
members of the Supreme Court saw habeas corpus as a safety valve
for innocent or unfairly convicted or sentenced capital defendants. 121
But concern over wasteful delay and repetition, the lack of qualified
representation for capital defendants, and a pattern of last-minute
filings have caused the Court, legislators, and commentators to re-
examine the role of habeas corpus. 122 The result of this effort is an
accumulation of Byzantine restrictions imposed by federal courts on
habeas corpus review. 23
Justice Harry A- Blackmun, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1994); Tara L. Swafford, Responding to
Herrera v. Collins: Ensuring That Innocents Are Not Executed, 45 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 603
(1995); Daniel Lim, State Due Process Guarantees for Meaningful Death Penalty Clemency
Proceedings, 28 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 47 (1994); Linda Greenhouse, A Capacity to Change
As Well As to Challenge, N.Y. Times § 4 at 4 (Feb. 27, 1994); David von Drehle, Retired Justice
Changes Stand on the Death Penalty; Powell Is Said to Favor Ending Executions, Wash. Post Al
(June 10, 1994); Jeffries, Powell (cited in note 102).
118. Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1440 (1988).
119. David A. Kaplan, Death Be Not Proud at the Court, Newsweek 52 (March 7, 1994).
120. Not all jurists agree with the assessment that post-Furman death penalty practice is
unworkable. California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk had overturned death sentences
but eventually came to uphold most because he believed the bugs of earlier death penalty law
had been eliminated. John T. Wold and John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices:
The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 Judicature 348, 349
(1987).
121. Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. &
Soc. Change 415, 415-16 (1990-91).
122. Steven M. Goldstein, Expediting the Federal Habeas Corpus Review Process in Capital
Cases: An Examination of Recent Proposals, 19 Capital U. L. Rev. 599, 604 (1990).
123. McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2790, 129 L. Ed. 2d 896 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)). For additional cases discussing
restrictions on habeas corpus review, see Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); McCleskey v.
Zant, 449 U.S. 467 (1991); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,
504 U.S. 1 (1992); Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 120 L. Ed. 2d 948 (1992). The most
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A recent major case, Herrera v. Collins,124 held that habeas
corpus relief is not available for a claim of innocence based on newly
found evidence. 125 Herrera illustrates the controversial nature of
these restrictions, and has been said to "epitomize all that has gone
wrong" with the Court's efforts to reform habeas corpus. 26 Some
decry the decision for cutting off the habeas corpus avenue of relief,
absent constitutional error, while at the same time insisting that a
convincingly innocent person would obtain relief. 27 Others praised
the Court's decision for promoting the states' interests in final judg-
ments and in federal state comity. 28 The ever-changing law govern-
ing habeas corpus review of death sentences has inspired prolific
commentary."29 What has been written will not be repeated here. It
is sufficient to say there is agreement that the Court has
substantially abbreviated the reach of the writ and will continue to do
so, leaving claims of factual innocence and unfair trials without
redress in the courts. 10
Wrongful convictions, the inherent difficulty of fairly adminis-
tering the death penalty, and diminished habeas corpus review argue
in favor of a contingency mechanism to prevent injustice. Unfairness
in the administration of the death penalty has been an important
component of an argument for its abolition.' 3' Even the death penalty
unwieldy of these rules came from Teague, 489 U.S. at 288, which held that if a constitutional
ruling was not "dictated by precedent" existing at the time a prisoner's conviction became final,
it constituted a "new rule" which could not be given effect in a post-conviction habeas corpus
proceeding. Id. at 310.
124. 113 S. Ct. 853, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993).
125. Id. at 857.
126. Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 Cal. L.
Rev. 485, 503 (1995). Professor Friedman has identified the Court's objectives as the promotion
of comity and finality. He concludes that, even eschewing a normative comparative yardstick in
favor of the Court's own goals, its efforts to reform habeas corpus have failed. Id. at 486-88.
127. See generally Vernon E. Googe III, Herrera v. Collins: Federal Habeas Corpus Review
and Claims of Actual Innocence, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 971 (1993).
128. Kevin M. Godbout, Comment, Herrera v. Collin- Federal Habeas Relief for State
Prisoners for Free-standing Claims of Actual Innocence Based on Newly Discovered Evidence?
Not Yet, 13 Bridgeport L. Rev. 725, 746 (1993).
129. See, for example, Stephen P. Garvey, Death-Innocence and the Law of Habeas Corpus,
56 Albany L. Rev. 225 (1992) (examining the penalty phase in capital cases); Jordan Steiker,
Innocence and Federal Habeas Corpus, 41 U.C.LA. L. Rev. 303 (1993) (evaluating the status of
bare innocence claims within the habeas corpus model).
130. Legislatures, too, are seeking to speed up executions. A bill introduced in the Texas
legislature would reduce the 8.1-year-average stay on death row by two years. Critics point to
the seven wrongfully convicted death row inmates released since 1987, six of whom would have
been executed had the new law been in effect. Supporters argue that the bill's expansion of
post-conviction legal representation will eliminate errors on appeal. Christy Hoppe, Death Row
Appeal Bill Advances, Dallas Morn. News Al, All (April 11, 1995).
131. Newton, 1 Tex. Forum on C.L. & C.R. at 1 (cited in note 13) (arguing that even one
who favors capital punishment in theory will oppose it when he learns that unfairness pervades
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proponent who is satisfied that the benefits derived from the penalty
(whatever they are perceived to be) outweigh the cost of wrongful
executions should want to maximize the reliability of the imposition of
death sentences. Therefore, the question is important to both groups.
Can commutation remedy some miscarriages of justice? The following
Sections pursue the answer to this question.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S FLAWED BELIEF THAT COMMUTATION
REMEDIES INJUSTICE
This Part investigates the assumptions that underlie the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on commutations and the death pen-
alty. Section A pursues the potential of the commutation power,
exploring the broadest defimition of commutation to establish that,
ideally, commutation can correct injustices that survive post-
conviction review. Section B examines supreme court decisions
relating to commutation and concludes that the Court relies on com-
mutation as a fail-safe measure to ensure fairness.
A The Purposes of Commutation
There was a time when the need for commutations was fairly
well accepted, though not entirely unquestioned.132 Today, however,
discussions of clemency are frequently prefaced with an apologial1s
The controversy is invited perhaps by the very nature of the commu-
tation power-it operates in derogation of the law.14 It is the antithe-
sis of the rule of law because it is called upon when legal rules have
failed to do justice. It is inherently paradoxical because it enhances
the practice). One commentator has observed that "the penalty of death cannot be imposed,
given the limitations of our minds and institutions, without considerable measures of both
arbitrariness and of mistake." Black, Capital Punishment at 32 (cited in note 18).
132. In United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 150, 160-61 (1833), Justice John
Marshall wrote of the clemency power as something akin to a divine gift. Although the power
continues to be interpreted broadly, that view was eschewed in Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480
(1927). Those who criticized the clemency power include strange bedfellows Immanuel Kant
and Jeremy Bentham. Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest
23-45 (Oxford U., 1989).
133. Lawmakers in a number of states have either proposed or threatened to propose
measures that would limit the exercise of commutation in their states. See, for example, Joan I.
Duffy, Senators Spar, Reject Broader Civil Rights Bill, Commercial Appeal A8 (March 26, 1993);
Joe Mahoney, DA Set to Fight Parole, Times Union BI (March 24, 1986); Martin van Der Werf,
Mofford's Teflon Coat is Peeling-Inmate Fiasco Stirs Questions, Ariz. Republic Al (Dec. 17,
1989).
134. DOJ Survey at 295 (cited in note 5).
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justice in general by overriding the justice system in a specific case.15
Of course, the ultimate critiques are that commutation is discretion-
ary"3 and operates largely without standards or review.137
Because certain historic applications of commutation are no
longer necessary, 18  because the power's roots are ancient, and
because capital defendants under the Warren and Burger Courts
came to enjoy "super due process," 39 many have come to view
commutation as redundant, outdated, and unsuitable in light of the
nation's concern over violent crime. This Section examines the
purposes that support clemency.
Reasons supporting grants of clemency have varied with the
executive and with the times.140 A review of the literature on the
history of the clemency power 4' suggests that the reasons that
authorities grant commutations are widely varied, but fall into three
categories relevant to this Article: (1) to promote justice where the
reliability of the conviction is in question, (2) to promote justice where
the reliability of the sentence 42 is in question, and (3) to promote
justice where neither the reliability of the conviction nor the sentence
is implicated.4 3  Commutations may be granted for justice-neutral
135. Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 572 (cited in note 4).
136. Tamar Lewin, Vast Discretion for Governors In Decisions on Death Penalty, N.Y.
Times A14 (May 20, 1992).
137. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 255, 257 (1990-91).
138. To observe the common law prohibition against executing the insane, death sentences
were commuted to life sentences when prisoners were determined to be insane. See Michael L.
Radalet and George W. Barnard, Ethics and the Psychiatric Determination of Competency to be
Executed, 14 Bulletin Am. Acad. Psych. & L. 37, 38-39 (1986); J.D. Feltham, The Common Law
and the Execution of Insane Criminals, 4 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 434, 475 (1964).
139. See note 3 and accompanying text.
140. Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 601-02 (cited in note 4) (citing Willard Harrison Humbert,
The Pardoning Power of the President 126 (American Council on Public Affairs, 1941)).
141. See Abramowitz and Paget, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 137-41 (cited in note 5) (tracing the
history of clemency in several cultures); Stanley Grupp, Some Historical Aspects of the Pardon
in England, 7 Am. J. Legal Hist. 51 (1963) (considering various historical aspects of the pardon
in England prior to the eighteenth century, with emphasis on its relation to the Crown); Kobil,
69 Tex. L. Rev. at 571-73 (cited in note 4) (examining the historical origins and the theoretical
underpinnings of the clemency power); Natl. Governors' Assn., Guide to Executive Clemency
Among the American States (Center for Policy Research, 1988) ("Governors' Guide") (listing the
types of clemency available in each state); DOJ Survey at 1-55 (cited in note 5); Hoffa v. Saxbe,
378 F. Supp. 1221, 1226-31 (D.D.C. 1974) (commenting on the adoption of the Pardons and
Reprieves Clause by the Constitutional Convention of 1787).
142. See note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the need for reliability in the determi-
nation that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case).
143. The categories used in this Article generally correlate to those labeled by Professor
Kobil as "justice enhancing" and "justice neutral." Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 579 (cited in note 4).
I subdivide the justice-enhancing commutations into three subgroups. Kobil's definition of
justice is helpful. He defines it in a retributive sense as denoting "fairness under the law so that
each person is rendered her due." Id. This is the way in which it is used in this Article.
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reasons as well, such as administrative expedience.'" Grants of clem-
ency may be said to fall into at least one and sometimes more than
one of these categories.
1. Justice-Promoting Commutations that Implicate the
Reliability of the Conviction
This category consists of commutations granted to promote
justice in an individual case where the reliability of the conviction is
questionable." 5 Examples include wrongful convictions brought to
light by new evidence and convictions that are unreliable because of
technical errors, doubt as to guilt, or an unfair trial.146 Sometimes a
dissenting judge provides particularly strong doubt about guilt.'4
Commutations granted in anticipation of rights not yet recognized' 48
are appropriately included in this group, as are those granted because
of the diminished mental capacity of the offender or his status as a
juvenile at the time of the crime.' 49
2. Justice-Promoting Commutations that Implicate the
Reliability of the Sentence
In this category are commutations granted to promote justice
in an individual case where the reliability of the sentence is in doubt.
This group includes unfair sentences remitted because the punish-
144. Of seventy post-Furman state commutations, forty-one were based on "judicial expedi-
ency" to avoid the time and expense of new sentencing proceedings where courts had vacated or
were likely to vacate a death sentence. Five were Virginia sentences imposed under a manda-
tory statute after the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated such statutes in Roberts v. Louisiana, 431
U.S. 633 (1977), and Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280. Thirty-six were Texas cases in which
commutations were granted to avoid judicial waste that would otherwise result because of a
peculiarity in Texas law. The state's highest criminal court, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, has held that it may not decrease a "punishment assessed by the jury." Ocker v. State,
477 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). When a death sentence is found to have been
erroneously imposed, the sentence alone may not be readjudicated. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
§ 37.07(3)(c) (West, 1993). Rather, the entire proceeding is treated as a mistrial. To avoid
retrial in these cases, the Governor simply commutes the death sentence to life. Radelet and
Zsembik, 27 U. Richmond L. Rev. at 293 (cited in note 6).
145. See Part II.A.
146. Abramowitz and Paget, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 138 (cited in note 5) (citing Robert J.
Bonner and Gertrude Smith, 2 The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle 253-56
(Greenwood, 1968)).
147. Id. at 170.
148. See Grupp, 7 Am. J. Legal Hist. at 60 (cited in note 141) (noting that a right that did
not exist at the time of a defendant's trial may be the basis for commutation if it later came into
existence but was not applied retroactively).
149. Abramowitz and Paget, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 166 (cited in note 5).
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ment outweighs the seriousness of the offense' 50 or because sentences
among co-defendants are disparate in light of their relative culpabil-
ity.'5 ' When mitigating factors have not been given appropriate
weight by the sentencer, 152 reductions of such sentences would fall
into this classification. This category also includes commutations that
promote equalization of sentences within a jurisdiction and those that
recognize and reward rehabilitation efforts. 53 Finally, commutations
may be granted for sentences that result from an unfair trial and for
sentences about which the presiding trial judge recommends leniency
to the clemency authority.
3. Justice-Promoting Commutations that Do Not Implicate Reliability
Not all justice-promoting clemency relates to the reliability of
an offender's conviction or sentence. Justice may be promoted by a
grant of commutation that rewards an offender's testimony against
his co-defendantM or because of the post-conviction mental condition
of the offender.155 Commutations of sentences to ameliorate the af-
fects of maldistribution 56 or to give sway to the recommendations of
judges and prosecutors may promote justice by improving the system
rather than individual results. 157 Retributivists might argue that in a
case in which public and political pressure favor commutation, grant-
ing it preserves the value of fairness that underpins the popular
conception of justice.15 A grant of clemency made in keeping with the
clemency authority's past practices promotes justice to the extent that
uniform classifications mete out like punishment for like crimes. 59
The wide range of purposes for commutation strongly suggest
that we would be well served to employ it for at least some of these
reasons. Commutation provides a unique opportunity to assess the
fairness of a given death sentence and the process that produced it.
150. Id. at 159-60.
151. Id. at 163-64.
152. Id. at 165-68; Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 571 (cited in note 4).
153. Abramowitz and Paget, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 168 (cited in note 5).
154. Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 589 (cited in note 4) (citing Leslie Sebba, Clemency in
Perspective, in Simha F. Landau and Leslie Sebba, eds., Criminology in Perspective: Essays in
Honor ofIsreal Drapkin 221, 225 (Lexington, 1977)).
155. Abramowitz and Paget, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 168-70 (cited in note 5).
156. See Moore, Pardons at 33 (cited in note 132). See also Abramowitz and Paget, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 164-65 (cited in note 5).
157. Abramowitz and Paget, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 171-72 (cited in note 5).
158. Id. at 172-75.
159. Id. at 176-77
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The following Section shows that the Supreme Court views commuta-
tion as providing such a safety net.
B. The Supreme Court's Commutation Jurisprudence
Numerous holdings, dicta, and separate opinions express views
of the Supreme Court and individual justices on clemency and
commutation. These views raise three points relevant to this discus-
sion. First, the Court's vision of clemency is sufficiently broad to
allow its use for any of the justice-enhancing purposes outlined above.
Each time the court has written of clemency it has employed terms
like justice and fairness liberally. Second, the Court has deregulated
capital punishment 6o and left formulation of death penalty policy,
including the exercise of clemency, to the states. Finally, the Court
clearly sees commutation as a real option for authorities who possess
the power.16' The Court uses the availability of commutation to
support its denial of remedies and its overall deregulation of death. 62
1. The Breadth of the Commutation Power
The Court's view of the clemency power has undergone change
over time. Early on, the justices saw it as something akin to a divine
power. 63 Perhaps the broadest characterization of clemency appears
in Ex Parte Garland.64 Upholding the presidential pardon of a con-
federate legislator, the Court wrote:
The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated
[impeachment]. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be ex-
ercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are
taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power
of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit
the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders.
The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any leg-
islative restrictions. 16 5
160. The term was coined by Robert Weisberg in his article Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 305. See Part II.B.2.
161. Harrington, Tex. Lawyer at 13 (cited in note 22). This authority is generally possessed
by state governors. Id.
162. See Part III.B.3.
163. See Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Peters) at 160 (looking to English law as the basis of U.S.
pardon law).
164. 71 U.S. (4 Wallace) 333 (1866).
165. Id. at 380.
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Six decades later the Court restricted its view of clemency and
eschewed the notion that clemency was an act of grace. In Biddle v.
Perovich,166 the Court wrote, "A pardon in our days is not a private act
of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is part of
the Constitutional scheme.."167 Thus, the power was not something to
be wielded with absolutely unfettered discretion, but rather was
somehow tied to the Constitution. Its purpose was broadly construed
to better serve the public welfare by "inflicting less than what the
judgment fixed.'' 68 The shift in Biddle was barely discernible as the
power continued to be interpreted rather generously.69
The Supreme Court has characterized clemency as a nearly
absolute power and a "solemn responsibility."170 Indeed, it has desig-
nated clemency an indicium of executive power.'17  The Court's juris-
prudence instructs that, because it is discretionary,172 clemency may
be granted conditionally,173 and grants or denials 74 are not subject to
judicial review. 75 Though abuses of the clemency power are possible
and happen from time to time, the Supreme Court has said that the
check for such abuse is impeachment rather than a constrictive
judicial interpretation of the executive's clemency power. 76
The Court interprets the clemency power broadly in other
ways. It sees clemency as an indispensable part of the criminal jus-
tice system, 7 although offenders usually have no right other than to
166. 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
167. Id. at 486. Constitutional authority for the commutation power of the president is
found in Article 2, § 2: "The President... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." U.S. Const., Art. 2, § 2.
168. Biddle, 274 U.S. at 486.
169. Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 594 (cited in note 4). See, for example, Schick v. Reed, 419
U.S. 256 (1974) (holding that the president may commute a sentence upon the conditition that
the prisoner never be eligible for parole).
170. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 13 (1950).
171. Moore, Pardons at 4 (cited in note 132).
172. In Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925), the Court observed: "[W]hoever is to make
[the clemency power] useful must have full discretion to exercise it." Id. at 121.
173. Schick, 419 U.S. at 260-64.
174. Both the grant of a commutation as well as its denial are exercises of the commutation
power. Hugo Adam Bedau, A Retributive Theory of the Pardoning Power?, 27 U. Richmond L.
Rev. 185, 188 (1993).
175. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). See also Solesbee,
339 U.S. at 12 (citing Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916)).
176. Grossman, 267 U.S. at 121. See also, Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 598 (cited in note 4)
(stating that even abusive use of presidential pardoning is insulated from judicial review).
177. In the first death penalty challenges following Furman, death row inmates argued
that the discretionary nature of the governor's power to commute death sentences rendered
death penalty schemes arbitrary and capricious, and therefore unconstitutional under Furman.
Seer Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and, in dicta, said that
removing all discretion from the state's death penalty practice would require the elimination of
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seek commutation.178 As a general matter, supreme court juris-
prudence establishes that clemency is a means to accomplish justice
in criminal matters. In Ex parte Grossman,79 the Court stated:
Executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident
mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal law. The administra-
tion of justice by the courts is not necessarily always wise or certainly consid-
erate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt. To afford a remedy,
it has always been thought essential in popular government... to vest in some
other authority than the courts power to ameliorate or avoid particular crimi-
nal judgments. It is a check entrusted to the executive for special cases.180
Finally, the Court has found that clemency's special justice-enhancing
character makes it distinct from legal remedies.181
The Court's vision is that the clemency power is one with broad
discretion, beyond judicial review, and capable of preventing injustice
in appropriate cases. The importance of this awesome power in death
penalty jurisprudence is compounded by the Court's deregulation of
the death penalty. Because the Supreme Court ultimately relies on
commutation to insure that justice is done, 8 2 the tale of deregulation
is worth retelling at this point.
2. The Deregulation of Death
Early in his tenure on the court, then-Associate Justice
Rehnquist advocated a limited role for federal courts in death penalty
matters. In Coleman v. Balkcom,183 he departed from the majority in
denying a petition for certiorari explaining that the case raised sig-
nificant issues about the administration of capital punishment and
reflected the increasing delay in the enforcement of death penalty
statutes.'8 He argued that once the Court had granted certiorari to
executive clemency and would be "totally alien to our notions of criminal justice
[and] ... unconstitutional." Id. at 200.
178. It was argued in Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981), that
the state's history of generous clemency grants resulted in a state-created right that could be
deprived only when due process had been given. Id. at 465. The Court held that the state had
created no such right because it had left the matter of commutations to the unfettered discretion
of the board. Id. at 466.
179. 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
180. Id. at 120-21.
181. In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), the Court said: 'Discharge from conviction
through habeas corpus is not an act of judicial clemency but a protection against illegal cus-
tody." Id. at 465.
182. See Part III.B.3.




decide questions involving federal rights, cases should then be
returned to state decision makers for execution or commutation. "In
any event," he wrote, "the decision would then be in the hands of the
State which had initially imposed the death penalty, not in the hands
of the federal courts."185 Justice Rehnquist got his wish just over a
decade later. In a "startling' group of cases decided at the close of the
1982 term, the Court went "out of the business of telling the states
how to administer the death penalty."'18
In retrospect, the Court's decision to deregulate death was not
surprising. Deregulation may have been foreshadowed even before
the Court first undertook regulation of the death penalty in
Furman.187 In McGautha v. California,188 Justice Harlan wrote for the
majority that it appeared to be beyond present human ability to
"identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides
and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express
these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and
applied by the sentencing authority."' 189 Justice Harlan dismissed the
petitioner's attempt to distinguish the guilt phase from the sentencing
phase of his trial as "the peculiar poignancy of the position of a man
whose life is at stake, coupled with the imponderables of the decision
which the jury is called upon to make."190 In the end, Justice Harlan
concluded that the Court "has nothing to teach the states about capi-
tal punishment" and so the issue must be left to the states. 9' Justice
Brennan dissented.
Though Justice Harlan's Edmund Burke prevailed over Justice
Brennan's Thomas Paine192 in McGautha, the plurality in Furman
struck down the death penalty as practiced a short time later.
Unfortunately, it is not clear what Furman condemned. It may have
overruled McGautha, or it may have admonished the states to solve a
185. Id. at 964.
186. Weisberg, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 305 (cited in note 160).
187. Id. at 308-13.
188. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
189. Id. at 204.
190. Id. at 216.
191. Weisberg, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 313 (cited in note 160).
192. Professor Weisberg compared Justice Harlan's skepticism to that of Edmund Burke,
and Justice Brennan's idealism to that of Thomas Paine. Id. at 311. Edmund Burke, a 19th
century statesman and political thinker, had conservative social and political views, which
included opposition to democracy and the belief that political expression should allow expression
of natural self-interest compatible with the common good. 3 The New Encyclopedia Britannica
499-502 (1984). Thomas Paine, on the other hand, was a political journalist and pamphleteer
who championed the rights of the common man. His writings reflected sympathy for the poor
and unfortunate, and advocated the elimination of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, and war.
13 The New Encyclopedia Britannica at 867-68.
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problem the Court was unable to articulate. 193 In any event, two
competing interpretations of the plurality decision of Furman have
been suggested-the "romantic view" and the "classical view."
The romantic view promotes the ideal of the fair administra-
tion of capital punishment. In his skepticism in McGautha, Justice
Harlan challenged the power of due process-attempting to rectify
arbitrary and capricious sentencing-and concluded that arbitrary
and capricious sentencing was inevitable. Furman took up Justice
Harlan's challenge. Determination and "good old American know-
how" would prevail, proving Justice Harlan to be wrong. According to
the romantic view, the Court had to formulate national policy in the
capital punishment arena. 194
The classical view, on the other hand, stresses that the Court
said much, but did little, in its 1976 pronouncements by accepting the
states' modest attempts to eliminate only the most egregious injus-
tices.195 The Court telegraphed the message to the states that very
little would be required to satisfy the objections of Furman and that
the states were free to administer the death penalty as they chose196
The absence of a single, unified position in Furman, as well as
the five cases decided in 1976197 and others that followed, lead ines-
capably to one of two interpretations. Either the Court demonstrated
commitment to disciplining state death penalty procedures, or it
never intended to do more than eradicate the most prejudicial of the
states' procedures, all the time acknowledging that constitutional
legal principles cannot make death penalty practice rational. 98
Whatever one's interpretation of McGautha and Furman, it is
clear that in 1983 the Court repudiated the romantic account and
announced that federal courts should stop regulating the imposition
of the death penalty. 99 The decision to deregulate death told capital
193. Weisberg, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 314-15 (cited in note 160).
194. Id. at 318-19.
195. See, for example, Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (holding that mandatory death penalties
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (holding that
imposition of the death penalty for rape violates the Eighth Amendment).
196. Weisberg, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 320-21 (cited in note 160).
197. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262; Woodson, 428
U.S. at 280; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 325.
198. Weisberg, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 313 (cited in note 160).
199. For example, in June 1993 the Court denied certiorari in twenty-nine Texas capital
cases, an unprecedented number in the Court's history. McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct 2785,
2789 (1994). It has been suggested that the enterprise of developing legal doctrine has been
pursued at great intellectual expense. In other words, the courts strained to maintain the
appearance of doctrinal rigor in an area that does not lend itself to rules of law. Weisberg, 1983
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defendants to look to the states to administer the death penalty fairly
and to provide a remedy for injustices that survive post conviction
review. The next Section examines the extent to which the Court or
individual justices have expressed faith in commutation as a fail-safe
measure to prevent unjust executions.
3. The Court's Reliance on Commutation
As the Supreme Court limits its review of death penalty cases,
it simultaneously recommends the idealized remedy of commutation
to death row inmates. This recommendation appears in majority
opinions denying legal relief and in dissents where justices do not
agree that a legal remedy is constitutionally required. In either
context the message is clear: an injustice the Court does not address
can be remedied by commutation.
Dissenters in some cases support their position that relief is
inappropriate by arguing that offenders can resort to commutation.
In Fay v. Noia,200 for example, the Court held that a state prisoner's
failure to appeal his felony murder conviction was not intelligent and
knowing and did not justify denying his right to seek federal habeas
corpus review. Justice Harlan dissented and, joined by Justices Clark
and Stewart, wrote, "I recognize that Noia's predicament may well be
thought one that strongly calls for correction. But the proper course
to that end lies with the New York Governor's powers of executive
clemency, not with the federal courts."201
The belief of some members of the Court that clemency is the
appropriate remedy for injustice appears elsewhere. In Thompson v.
Oklahoma,2 0 2 Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice White in dissenting from the plurality's holding that the
Constitution forbids the execution of a defendant who was fifteen
years old at the time he committed murder. Justice Scalia argued
that the plurality overstated the consensus against executing
juveniles: "the plurality examines the statistics on capital executions,
which are of course substantially lower than those for capital
sentences because of various factors, most notably the exercise of
executive clemency. "203 He continued, 'The Governor of Oklahoma,
Sup. Ct. Rev. at 307 (cited in note 160). See generally Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death
Penalty, 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 67 (1992).
200. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
201. Id. at 476 (Harlan, C.J., dissenting, joined by Clark and Stewart, JJ.).
202. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).




who can certainly recognize a frustration of the will of the citizens of
Oklahoma more readily than we, would certainly have used his par-
don power if there had been some mistake here."204
Dissents in non-capital cases also express the belief that com-
mutation will correct injustice. In Boyd v. Dutton,20 5 Justice Powell
dissented from a per curiam remand for an evidentiary hearing on
waiver of the right to counsel. He conceded that "[i]t is true that
petitioner is uneducated, and that the sentence imposed seems dis-
proportionate to the crime, ''2° but nonetheless offered a salve. In a
footnote, Justice Powell suggested that the petitioner, "having served
some eight years, may well merit consideration for parole or executive
clemency.207
In majority opinions, as well, the Court has announced its
reliance on commutation to prevent injustice. Harmelin v.
Michigan2 8 upheld a state statute imposing a mandatory life sentence
without the possibility of parole for possession of more than 650
grams of cocaine. The petitioner claimed that the sentence consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment because it was disproportionate
to his culpability and because it was mandatory. Justice Scalia, writ-
ing for the majority on this point, acknowledged that it was unique for
Michigan to have made the second most severe sentence mandatory
for this crime. He further noted that, even though the Michigan stat-
ute forecloses the use of "flexible techniques" to later reduce a defen-
dant's sentence, not all means of reducing the sentence were elimi-
nated. Optimistically, he wrote, "[T]here remain the possibilities of
retroactive legislative reduction and executive clemency."209
In the landmark case of Herrera v. Collins ,210 the Court made it
clear that the federal courts are not ultimately responsible for pre-
venting the execution of arguably innocent people. It held that ha-
beas corpus relief is not available for a claim of innocence based on
newly discovered evidence.211 The petitioner had argued that the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of an
innocent man and that he, in fact, was innocent according to evidence
204. Id. at 876 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.). 'Mistake"
in this context meaning the execution of children against the will of Oklahoma citizens.
205. 405 U.S. 1 (1972).
206. Id. at 7 (Powell, J., dissenting). The petitioner was sentenced to twenty-eight years for
forging or possessing forged checks totaling $140. Id. at 4.
207. Id. at 7 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
208. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
209. Id. at 996 (emphasis added).
210. 113 S. Ct. 853, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993).
211. Id. at 857.
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that had not been heard at his trial. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, pointed out that the presumption of innocence disap-
pears after a fair trial and conviction 12 and that due process does not
mandate that all possible precautions be taken to avoid convicting the
innocent.213 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the claim of innocence
was cognizable in Texas courts but that the time for raising this claim
had passed.214 The thirty-day period Texas provided for raising the
claim was not constitutionally objectionable, Justice Rehnquist
concluded, noting that fourteen other states had periods of thirty days
or shorter for petitioning for a new trial based on new evidence.215
Therefore, Texas's refusal to hear the new evidence did not transgress
a "principle of fundamental fairness 'rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people.' "216 Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained
that, absent an independent constitutional violation, federal habeas
corpus relief was not available to Mr. Herrera, all the while insisting
that the Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence does not cast "a blind
eye towards innocence."217
The holding in Herrera has been often and soundly criticized. 218
While its primary impact has been to further foreclose review of capi-
tal cases, its truly malignant effect may be that the Court has now
damned many death row inmates to the fiction of clemency relief.
After refusing to place innocence under the umbrella of protection
provided by habeas corpus, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
This is not to say, however, that petitioner is left without a forum to raise his
actual innocence claim. For under Texas law, petitioner may file a request for
212. Id. at 860.
213. Id.
214. Tex. R. App. Pro. 31(a)(1) allows a defendant to move for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence within 30 days after imposition or suspension of the sentence. The rule has
been construed as jurisdictional. Beathard v. State, 767 S.W.2d 423, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
215. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 865 n.8.
216. Id. at 866 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).
217. Id. at 862.
218. "Herrera ranks as one of those infamous Supreme Court opinions, like Lochner and
Plessy, that is utterly repugnant to any basic sense of fairness. Indeed, it prompted one of the
harshest dissents in the history of the Court." Newton, Tex. Forum on C.L. & C.R. at 34 (cited
in note 13). See Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court as a Partially Political Institution, 17
Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 149 (1994); Kathleen Cava Boyd, Note, The Paradox of 'Actual
Innocence" in Federal Habeas Corpus After Herrera v. Collins, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 479 (1994); Jill
Hanson Reinmuth, Comment, When Actual Innocence is Irrelevant: Federal Habeas Relief for
State Prisoners After Herrera v. Collins, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 279 (1994); Recent Development,
Herrera v. Collins: The Right of Innocence: An Unrecognized Constitutional Privilege, 20 J.
Contemp. L. 258 (1994); Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 U.C.LA L. Rev. 303
(1993); Charles R. Morse, Recent Development, Habeas Corpus and Actual Innocence:" Herrera
v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 848 (1993); Harrington, Tex. Lawyer
at 13 (cited in note 22).
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executive clemency.219 Clemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradi-
tion of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice
where judicial process has been exhausted.220
The Chief Justice quoted Blackstone for the proposition that in
exercising clemency the monarch holds a "court of equity in his own
breast, to soften the rigour of... law."221 Justice Rehnquist noted
that, while the Constitution does not require it, all thirty-six jurisdic-
tions that authorize the death penalty have a constitutional or
statutory provision for clemency. He concluded that Texas had a
clemency process in place that would allow Herrera an opportunity to
avoid execution if he were in fact innocent.222
The commutation ideal envisions relief for condemned prison-
ers whose guilt is in doubt, for those whose trials were flawed, and for
those whose trials may have resulted in different outcomes had to-
day's rules been in place. In short, it can be employed to ensure that
the end product of the criminal justice system is just. The Court's
jurisprudence affirms this ideal. The next Part asks whether the
Court's faith in the states' commutation processes is justified.
IV. THE REALITY OF COMMUTATION PRACTICE
This Part describes the operation of state commutation
practices generally. It notes a decline in the number of commutations
granted and explores reasons that may account for this decline. It
culminates with a case study-the commutation petition of William
Andrews.
A. The Operation of State Commutation Practices
Describing the "typical" state commutation process is
challenging. Diversity is a hallmark of statutes that govern clemency
throughout the states. Nevertheless, the statutes have these features
in common: procedures are largely standardless, decisions are
discretionary, and results are unreviewable.223
219. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 866 (citing Tex. Const., Art. IV., § 11; Tex. Crim. Proc. Code
Ann., § 48.01 (Vernon, 1979)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 867 (citing William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries 397 (U. Chicago, 1979)).
222. Id. at 868-69.
223. Bedau, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 257 (cited in note 137). Not much has
changed in three decades. Abramowitz and Paget, writing in 1964, observed:
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In the American system of government, the clemency power is
not inherent in any particular branch of government,22 4 although it is
usually associated with the executive branch. Elkan Abramowitz and
David Paget observed a trend in the first half of this century away
from clemency's exclusive exercise by governors and toward the
creation of advisory boards that counsel the governor in clemency
matters or restrain him or her from acting without its favorable
recommendation. 2 5 Some boards have entirely displaced governors in
clemency decisions.2 6 Today, state laws fall into one of three basic
models. In the first model, the governor has primary or exclusive
authority to grant commutations in death penalty cases.
227 Most
states follow this approach.228 In the second model, a parole or
pardons board has primary or exclusive jurisdiction over the
commutation of capital sentences. 229 In the third model, the clemency
power is shared by the governor and the parole or pardons board.20
The use of the commutation power is more or less vulnerable to
public pressure depending upon where the power is vested and who
appoints the decision makers.23 1 The Guide to Executive Clemency
Among the American States indicates that in most of the states that
vest the clemency power in a board, its members are appointed by the
governor. 2 2 That most states continue to vest primary clemency
power in the governor was borne out by a recent study by the
(1) the exercise of the clemency power is completely within the discretion of the
clemency authority and cannot effectively be challenged in the courts; (2) the clemency
hearing is not an appeal and the clemency authority is not bound by the substantive,
procedural, and evidentiary rules applicable to the courts; (3) no one has a right to
clemency review, much less a clemency hearing, unless state law so provides; (4) the due
process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not apply in full to the
clemency system.
Abramowitz and Paget, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 177 (cited in note 5).
224. Christen Jensen, The Pardoning Power in the American States 115 (U. Chicago, 1922).
225. Abramowitz and Paget, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 141 (cited in note 5).
226. Id.
227. Governors' Guide at 15 (cited in note 141). See, for example, Ala. Const., Art. V, § 124;
Ala. Code § 15-22-36 (1983); Wilson v. State, 268 Ala. 86, 105 So.2d 66 (1958).
228. Governors' Guide at 15 (cited in note 141).
229. Id. See, for example, Ga. Const., Art. 4, § II, para. H-A; Ga. Code Ann. § 42-9-20
(1994).
230. Governors' Guide at 15 (cited in note 141). The governor either sits on the board or
may not grant commutation without the favorable recommendation of the board. See, for
example, Ind. Const., Art. 5, § 17; Ind. Code § 11-9-2-2 (1992 & Supp. 1995). See also notes 257-
60 and accompanying text.
231. In some states, the entire range of clemency power is vested in the same body; in
others, it is divided among more than one authority. Governors' Guide at 164 (cited in note
141). For example, Florida's governor may suspend fines and grant reprieves alone, but must
have the approval of three cabinet members to grant a pardon or commute a sentence. Fla.
Admin. Code Ann. R. 27-8.009, Rule 1 (1976).
232. Governors' Guide at 17-20 (cited in note 141).
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Association of Paroling Authorities International.233 The 1994 survey
of paroling authorities asked representatives from fifty-two boards23
whether they were empowered to commute sentences. Five responded
that they were, twelve replied they were not, and thirty-five said that
they could recommend commutation to the governor.23
Typically, clemency requests require investigation to ensure
that sufficient facts are available to the decision maker.B6 The inves-
tigation is usually conducted by the staff of the decision maker.237 A
clemency investigation typically inquires into the circumstances sur-
rounding the crime, the petitioner's biography, reports of psychologi-
cal and psychiatric examinations, and comments from the trial judge
and prosecuting attorney.2 8  More recently, investigations have
included input from victims.239 Some of the information garnered may
be confidential.240
Few state or federal courts have considered whether the Due
Process Clause requires fair procedures in the consideration of
clemency petitions. Those courts that have considered the issue have
provided no constitutional protection.241 Commutation procedures are
therefore quite varied.242 Procedures for clemency application range
from informal to formal submission of an official petition. The greater
the formality, the greater the burden on the applicant and, seemingly,
the greater the need for legal representation. At one time, virtually
all petitioners were represented by counsel.243 Today, state statutes
regarding representation range from prohibiting representatives of
233. John C. Runda, Edward E. Rhine, and Robert E. Wetter, The Practice of Parole Boards
(Interntl. Assoc. of Paroling Authorities, 1994).
234. The survey included the boards for the District of Columbia and the U.S. Parole
Commission. See id.
235. Id. at 44.
236. Governors' Guide at 176 (cited in note 141). See also Abramowitz and Paget, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 148 (cited in note 5).
237. This might be the staff of the governor, the board, or both. Abramowitz and Paget, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 149 (cited in note 5). See also Governors' Guide at 177 (cited in note 141).
238. Abramowitz and Paget, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 148 (cited in note 5).
239. Governors' Guide at 16 (cited in note 141).
240. Fla. Rule Admin. 7.B.
241. Otey v. Stenberg, 34 F.3d 635, 637 (8th Cir. 1994); Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402,
1424 (11th Cir. 1988).
242. Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 619 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The clemency decision
of the governor and cabinet of Florida did not infringe or implicate any interest protected by the
Due Process Clause").
243. Abramowitz and Paget, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 147-48 (cited in note 5).
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applicants from receiving fees 2" to providing counsel for an applicant
who is indigent.24 5
There is great variation in clemency hearings, as well.
Usually, the clemency authority is not required to conduct a hear-
ing.246 If a hearing is held, some states allow the petitioner to attend
the clemency hearing;247 others do not. Those who do not allow the
petitioner to attend the hearing may conduct an interview and include
the transcript or report in the file prior to the hearing.248 In the
overwhelming number of states, clemency hearings are public249 and
informal. Some states have written procedures, 250 but many do not.
251
The course of the hearing is determined by the presiding official, and
the rules of evidence do not apply.252 Officials conducting clemency
hearings often have subpoena power,253 although few states make a
transcript or other record of the clemency hearing.2- Most states
require clemency decisions to be reported to the legislature or filed
with the Secretary of State.255
"[No state constitution] conditions the exercise of clemency [on]
articulated standards. 56  Richard Burr, Director of the Capital
Punishment Project of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, describes the governors' clemency discretion as a 'Wizard of
Oz" process because it completely lacks standards.257 Nor do courts
limit the discretion of those making commutation decisions.2 8 The
federal courts treat the executives' reasons for granting clemency as
beyond review, with the narrow exception of reviewing and invali-
dating some pardons for impermissible effect, such as those resulting
244. Governors' Guide at 76 (cited in note 141). See, for example, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3706
(1981).
245. Fla. Stat. § 925.035.
246. See, for example, Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 475-3.10 (1995). But see Ariz. Rule Admin. 5-
4-602 (1995), which requires the board to conduct a "personal interview" with the condemned
person. In Bundy, 850 F.2d at 1424, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a claim that the lack of a
clemency hearing violated the Eighth Amendment.
247. See, for example, Utah Rule Admin. 671-302-2.
248. Abramowitz and Paget, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 149 (cited in note 5).
249. Id. at 155. See, for example, Ind. Code Ann. § 4-22-3-1 (Burns, 1990).
250. See, for example, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:572.4A (West, 1992).
251. Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 605 (cited in note 4).
252. Abramowitz and Paget, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 156 (cited in note 5).
253. Id.; Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-9-(3) (1994).
254. Abramowitz and Paget, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 156-57 (cited in note 5).
255. Id. at 157.
256. Id. at 143.
257. Lewin, N.Y. Times at A14 (cited in note 136).
258. Not everyone finds this degree of discretion disturbing. Former Ohio Governor
Michael DiSalle said that the precise grounds on which clemency should be granted are more
easily felt than prescribed. DiSalle, 25 Ohio St. L. J. at 71 (citing Montesquieu, Spirit of the
Laws (D. Appleton, Thomas Nugent trans. 1900)).
346 [Vol. 49:311
DEATH PENALTY COMMUTATION
in violations of the Equal Protection Clause.259 State courts place
equal confidence in the decision making of commutation authorities.260
A state clemency system is more than the sum of its proce-
dures. It includes a human factor that results from the personal
impact decision making has on the decision maker.261 The decision
always rests heavily on the shoulders of those who must make it. The
next Section discusses the decreasing frequency with which those who
hold this awesome power exercise it.
B. The Decline in the Use of Commutation
If at one time the commutation power was a meaningful source
of justice, this is no longer the case. The heyday of commutations was
the early- and mid-1940s, during which twenty to twenty-five percent
of death penalties were commuted.262 Though not written at this time,
books by former California Governor Edmund (Pat) Brown263 and
former Ohio Governor Michael V. DiSalle264 illustrate that, while
commutations were not commonplace during the 1960s, they were
sufficiently frequent that, at least in some states, meritorious cases
were carefully considered and commuted. Members of the Furman
Court noted that commutations accounted for a decline in the number
of annual executions in the years prior to 1972.265 Commutation was
one of several reasons that executions had dwindled to approximately
eighteen cases a year prior to Furman.265 By Justice Brennan's
259. Osborne v. Folmer, 735 F.2d 1316, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that a pardon of a
parole decision may be challenged on equal protection grounds).
260. Andrews v. Utah Board of Pardons, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 836 P.2d 790, 794 (1992)
('The grant or denial of [a new commutation] hearing is a matter committed to the sound
discretion of the Board of Pardons").
261. Most governors have not welcomed commutation petitions. Former Louisiana
Governor Edwin Edwards tried to divest himself of the power altogether. To Sister Helen
Prejean he said:
I tried to get the legislature to remove the whole process from the governor, hut I rec-
ognize that in the final analysis some one person has to have the authority to stop the
execution.... The whole process is in the judicial system; then, all of a sudden, in the
last thirty days to have it sitting on the heart and mind and soul of one man is a very
difficult position to be in.
Prejean, Dead Man Walking at 57 (cited in note 53).
262. Bedau, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 262 (cited in note 137).
263. Edmund G. (Pat) Brown, Sr., with Dick Adler, Public Justic, Private Mercy: A
Governor's Education on Death Row (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989).
264. Michael V. DiSalle and Lawrence G. Blochman, The Power of Life and Death (Random
House, 1965).
265. 408 U.S. at 291-92.
266. Id. at 292 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing U.S. Dept. of Justice, National Prisoner
Statistics No. 46: Capital Punishment 1930-1970 at 9 (1971)).
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account, governors had "regularly commuted a substantial number" of
death cases. 267 Long after commutations ceased to be common,
however, writers have continued to promote the belief that they occur
with great frequency.268
In the last quarter century, there has been a dramatic decline
in death penalty commutations-so much so that some say the clem-
ency power is now defunct. Michael Radelet, a noted University of
Florida sociologist, believes that "clemency is not a component of the
modern death-sentencing process. ' '269 Experiences in Florida and
Louisiana illustrate how sharp the decline has been. Between 1920
and 1972, Florida governors commuted from twenty to forty percent of
death sentences. After the penalty was reinstated in 1976, only six
sentences were commuted by Governor Bob Graham, and neither of
his successors have commuted any capital sentences. 270 Writing in
1974, William J. Bowers observed that about one in four or five death
sentences was commuted to life imprisonment.271 By 1988, data
collected by Hugo Adam Bedau demonstrated that the frequency had
dwindled to one in forty. The decline has prompted some to declare
that clemency, like UFOs and Bigfoot, exists only in theory.272
The phenomenon of declining clemency grants is also present
in the federal system, although until recently there was no federal
death penalty.273 The presidential clemency power has atrophied in
the last half century. President Johnson granted over seventy
clemencies per year at the beginning of his term.274 When he was
criticized for one in particular, the number was reduced to only five
267. Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring).
268. "[J]uries ... give due consideration to the incontrovertible fact that the vast majority
of those sentenced to death will be finally reprieved." Leon S. Sheliff, Ultimate Penalties:
Capital Punishment, Life Imprisonment, Physical Torture 111 (Ohio St. U., 1987). The use of
"reprieve" in this statement creates the erroneous impression that commutation rather than
errors ferreted out in the appeals process account for the diminution in death sentences.
269. Berry, Dallas Morn. News at 1J (cited in note 22).
270. Id.
271. Bedau, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 266 (cited in note 137) (citing William J.
Bowers, Executions in America 76 n.b. (Lexington, 1974)).
272. Id. at 266, 270 n.97 (citing David von Drehle, Clemency Exists Only in Theory, Miami
Herald 8 (July 10-13, 1988)). This perception was borne out by the experience of Sister Prejean
when she approached Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards regarding a commutation of the
sentence of Patrick Sonnier. She believes that he was not merely predisposed to deny the
clemency request, but that he had already made up his mind not to grant it, regardless of the
merits of Sonnier's case. Prejean, Dead Man Walking at 55-56 (cited in note 53).
273. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (1994 ed.) (providing the death penalty for murders that occur
in the context of certain specified drug transactions).




over the remaining eighteen months of his presidency.275 President
Nixon granted thirty-six percent of all requests for clemency;
President Ford awarded twenty-seven percent; and President Carter
just over twenty-one percent.276  President Bush granted fewer
clemencies during his tenure than most presidents in the past twenty-
five years.277 Presidential clemency has become trivialized, now being
almost exclusively a tool to cleanse the records of federal offenders
who have served their sentences as originally imposed and as a post
incarceration benefit of good behavior.278
A death row inmate who petitions for commutation to a life
sentence has only the remotest hope for relief. The next Section of
this Article investigates the reasons for the decline in commutations.
It argues that among the myriad reasons, political consequences con-
tribute most directly and most significantly to the erosion of commu-
tations.
C. The Reasons for the Decline
There are many circumstances that have contributed to the
atrophy of commutation power. First and foremost, the political con-
sequences of granting commutations are simply too great. This is
evident from the experiences of those who have granted commutations
and from the efforts of legislatures to abolish or limit clemency.279
The political pressure is, at least in part, a reaction to past abuses of
the power.280 Second, many believe that commutation is no longer
necessary. They mistakenly believe that the judicial system is flexible
enough to render full justice281 and that injustice cannot survive
"super due process.282 Third, there is a conservative philosophy
among executives that the judgments of courts and juries should not
be overridden.283 This Section explores the political ramifications of
275. Id.
276. Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 602 (cited in note 4).
277. Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a Governor's
Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J. L. & Pol. 1, 49
(1994).
278. Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 604 (cited in note 4).
279. Cobb, 99 Yale L. J. at 394-95 (cited in note 68).
280. The change in public attitude toward pardons began with the excesses of then-
Tennessee Governor Ray Blanton and the scandal that followed. John Maginnis, The Last
Hayride 207 (Gris, 1984).
281. Cobb, 99 Yale L. J. at 394-95 (cited in note 68).
282. Bedau, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 268-69 (cited in note 137) (describing the
multiple levels of procedure required to impose a death sentence).
283. Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 602-03 (cited in note 4).
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commutations and argues that, standing alone, they can and have
prevented appropriate exercises of commutation.
Some governors have been generous in their exercise of clem-
ency,2 but serious political consequences can follow when a governor
grants clemency against the popular will. Pat Brown held office as
the governor of California from 1959 to 1966. He believed that his
death row decisions played a part in his sound defeat by Ronald
Reagan.2 5 Republican Dave Treen challenged incumbent Louisiana
Governor Edwin Edwards in 1979 and used Edwards's clemency
record to help defeat him.286
Commuting a death sentence can pose personal risks as well.
When New Mexico's Governor Tony Anaya had made up his mind to
commute the sentences of the five offenders on death row, he spoke
with no one about his intention because of threats of physical injury
and even death he had received, presumably to deter or prevent his
exercising the commutation power.287 Just considering commutation
can be risky as well. When the Utah board conducted its
commutation hearing for William Andrews in 1989, the community
was in a furor and board members were advised to take security
precautions. Officers, some with trained guard dogs, stood watch at
the homes of some board members twenty-four hours a day while the
matter was pending.288
President Clinton may be among those who have found oppos-
ing the death penalty politically untenable. During his first term as
governor of Arkansas, Clinton refused to set execution dates for two
dozen death-row inmates and commuted forty-four life-without-parole
sentences to make them parole eligible.28 9 Between the start of his
second term and 1992, Clinton moved quickly to set execution dates,
declined to stop the executions of three men, and reduced life
sentences only seven times.2 90  During his presidential campaign,
Clinton denied the commutation request of Ricky Ray Rector who had
"effectively lobotomized himself with a self-inflicted gunshot to the
284. For example, a few governors have been known to commute all death sentences during
their terms, despite public outcry and even law suits filed by the legislature. These include
Massachusetts Governor Endicott Peabody (1963-65), Oregon Governor Robert D. Holmes (1957-
59), and New Mexico Governor Tony Anaya (1986). Governors' Guide at 3 (cited in note 141).
285. Brown with Adler, Public Justice at 52 (cited in note 263). Governor Brown lost the
election by almost a million votes. Id.
286. Maginnis, The Last Hayride at 208-10 (cited in note 280).
287. Id. at 182.
288. The Author was a member of the board at this time.
289. George E. Jordan, Clinton and Crime: Supports Capital Punishment as a Sign of




head, after he shot and killed a police officer."291 There is substantial
doubt about whether Rector realized he was about to die. On the way
to the execution chamber he said he intended to vote for Mr.
Clinton. 92
For governors, the choice is a pragmatic one. When a "tough
on crime" policy prevails in a state, commutations are reduced.293 In
all likelihood, wariness of political fallout accounts for some of the
decline in commutations, despite the increase in the number of per-
sons slated for execution.294
Public opposition to commutation can affect more than just the
governor or board. It can have repercussions for the decision maker's
office itself. Public outcry has prompted state legislators to introduce
bills to abolish or limit the commutation power. After New Mexico's
Governor Anaya issued two stays of execution, constitutional amend-
ments and bills limiting the governor's power were introduced in the
legislature, although none were passed.29  Similarly, the Utah
legislature considered and rejected abolition of commutation after a
high-profile, though unsuccessful, commutation hearing.296 Some
years later the Utah legislature succeeded in limiting the power.297
This legislative action was a major encroachment on the authority of
one of the most powerful parole boards in the country.
It may be that the caution of today's governors has been en-
gendered by the excesses of their predecessors. The commutation
power provides the flexibility necessary to correct injustice, but it also
provides opportunities for abuse. In the past, some governors have
seized those opportunities. Oklahoma Governor J.C. Walton was
impeached for selling pardons.298 Perhaps one of the best known
291. Berry, Dallas Morn. News at 1J (cited in note 22).
292. Id.
293. Cheatwood, 34 Crime & Delinq. at 49 (cited in note 4) (citing Susan E. Martin,
Commutation of Prison Sentences: Practice, Promise, and Limitation, 29 Crime & Delinq. 593,
608 (1983)). Not all commentators agree about the effect of public opinion on clemency decision
makers. Michael Radelet believes that there is an "erroneous perception that public opinion
would not tolerate commutation." Berry, Dallas Morn. News at 1J (cited in note 22). Nor does
Hugo Bedau believe it is necessary for a governor or pardon board to be extraordinarily
courageous or to have a political death wish in order to commute a capital sentence. Bedau, 18
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 261 (cited in note 137).
294. Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 609-10 (cited in note 4).
295. Toney Anaya, Statement by Toney Anaya on Capital Punishment, 27 U. Richmond L.
Rev. 177, 180 (1993).
296. The Heavy In Selby Odyssey Is Not State Pardons Board, Salt Lake Tribune A18 (Sept.
6, 1987); Phil Jensen, Panel Tables Pardons Bill After Long Debate, Ogden Standard-Examiner
1A (Oct. 22, 1987).
297. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5.5 (1992).
298. DOJ Survey at 150-53 (cited in note 5).
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abuses of clemency power took place in Tennessee, where Parole
Board Chair Marie Raggianti played a key role in the prosecution of
board members who subsequently confessed to selling paroles.29
Then-Tennessee Governor Ray Blanton was also implicated. And in
Louisiana, before Republican Dave Treen defeated incumbent
Governor Edwin Edwards in 1979, he revealed that Edwards had
pardoned 1,181 convicts, including 124 convicted murderers, that one
pardoned man paid a state representative $2,000 to influence the
Governor in his case, and that the Governor's executive counsel and
the Governor's brother represented many successful clients in
clemency matters.300
Although blatant abuses such as selling commutations are
reprehensible, even more insidious are subtle abuses such as those
uncovered by Sister Prejean in the early 1980s as she advocated for
death row inmates Pat Sonnier and Robert Willie before the
Louisiana Pardons Board, which makes recommendations to the
Governor. After the petitions for these men were denied, the board
chairman, Howard Marsellus, was convicted of accepting a $5,000
bribe for the pardon of an Angola inmate.30 1 In a telephone conversa-
tion with Marsellus a year after his release from a federal prison in
Fort Worth, Sister Prejean learned about how clemency really oper-
ated during that period.30 2
Sister Prejean learned that politically volatile cases had no
hope of commutation. Such a case was that of Tim Baldwin, convicted
of having murdered his 81-year-old grandmother. When Baldwin
applied to the board for clemency, the investigation raised doubts in
Marsellus's mind about Baldwin's guilt. He took those doubts to the
Governor's chief counsel, Bill Roberts, whose response was that the
Governor did not like to be confronted with such cases.30 3 Roberts
directed the board to "handle it." Roberts asked Marsellus, "Why do
you think we appointed you, Howard? This is why you're chair of this
committee. If you can't hack it, we'll just have to replace you with
someone who can."304 It was a simple statement of fact. Marsellus
believed that the Governor relied on the board's negative recommen-
dation to avoid the political fallout of commuting a sentence. The
Sonnier and Willie commutation petitions were denied for similar
299. Peter Maas, Marie, A True Story 414 (Random House, 1983).
300. Maginnis, The Last Hayride at 208-10 (cited in note 280).
301. Prejean, Dead Man Walking at 169 (cited in note 53).
302. Id.




reasons.3 5  On the other hand, when files marked "Expedite"
appeared on the board's calendar, it was understood that a deal had
been cut with the Governor's office. Marsellus's job was to see that
recalcitrant board members cooperated in delivering the outcome the
Governor had already promised.306
Howard Marsellus spoke at a conference on the death penalty
at Loyola University in New Orleans on July 7, 1993. He depicted the
pardon and parole process as a "cesspoor' and described a "cheat list"
containing names of prisoners whose hearings were expedited
"depending on the urgency or how important the supporting person
was. People with money, power, or respect in the community could
get the attention of the decision makers. Poor whites and blacks were
at the mercy of the system."3 7 Marsellus continued, "Everyone on the
board knew from the outset that we could not send a recommendation
for commutation of the sentence to the governor. The governor did
not want to be put in the position of having to make the ultimate
decision of whether a man lived or died. It was much easier to accept
the decision of the pardon board."308
Though there may be disagreement about why governors sel-
dom grant clemency, there is no refuting that the incidence of clem-
ency grants has slowed to a trickle. Yet, applications for clemency are
filed by death row inmates as routinely as are petitions for appellate
review.30 9 What happens when the optimism of the Supreme Court's
commutation jurisprudence is tested by the reality of a commutation
petition from death row? The next Section uses a case study to
address this question.
D. The Commutation Petition of William Andrews
The commutation petition of William Andrews was the culmi-
nation of a saga that is typical of death penalty cases, as he raised
numerous claims that were unsuccessful in the courts.310 Neither the
evidence nor Mr. Andrews suggested there was doubt about his par-
305. Id.
306. Id. at 169-73.
307. Berry, Dallas Morn. News at iJ (cited in note 22).
308. Id.
309. Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Due Process Protection in Capital Clemency
Proceedings, 90 Yale L. J. 889, 896 (1981).
310. See, for example, Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (affirming the
appellant's capital conviction for the murder of a convenience store clerk and rejecting the
appellants twelve points of error).
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ticipation in this serious crime311 Nevertheless, his case calls into
question the reliability of his conviction for capital murder and his
death sentence. It is a case study of the factors that can undermine
the reliability of a death sentence and, therefore, invites discussion of
the ability of the clemency power to inject justice into current death
penalty practice.
William Andrews was an African-American airman who was
stationed in Utah in 1974. He, Keith Roberts,312 and Pierre Dale
Selby313 robbed a Hi-Fi Shop in a nearby community. Only Mr.
Andrews and Mr. Selby entered the shop. During the three-hour
robbery, five white people were tortured, and three were killed.
Andrews participated in the torture but left when his companion
indicated he intended to kill the victims. 31 4 A black, non-Mormon
tried in a community of outraged white Mormons, Andrews was
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Despite
numerous flaws in the process leading to Andrews's conviction and
sentencing,' 15 both were upheld (over sometimes vigorous dissents31 )
311. There are, to be sure, more sympathetic cases, but Andrews's case is appropriate to
make the point that reliability is important in every case.
312. As an interesting aside relevant to culpability, some, including then-Weber County
Attorney Robert L. Newey, believed Roberts was the mastermind of the robbery, though he did
not enter the shop or participate in the murders. Charles F. Trentelman, Third Participant in
Hi-Fi Case to be Paroled, Ogden Standard-Examiner Al (May 8, 1987). There was circumstan-
tial evidence that linked Roberts to the murders, but the jury could not reach a verdict on the
three counts of murder against him. State v. Andrews, 574 P.2d 711, 711-12 (Utah 1977). The
trial judge believed Roberts would have been convicted of murder had he been tried alone.
Letter from Judge John F. Walqust, Second Judicial District, to Warden Sam Smith, Utah
State Prison, and Michael D. Cannon, Secretary of the Utah State Board of Pardons (Jan. 2,
1975) (on file with the Board). Roberts, a native of Oklahoma, was paroled after serving twelve
years on two counts of robbery. Laurie Sulivan, Hi-Fi Robber Receiving Parole as 2 Others
Await Execution, Deseret News 2B (May 8, 1987).
313. At the time of the crime, his name was Dale Selby Pierre. See State v. Dale S. Pierre,
572 P.2d 1338, 1338 (Utah 1977). He later changed it to Pierre Dale Selby. Andrews v. Shulsen,
94 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 773 P.2d 832, 832 (1988).
314. One court found that "Andrews... was not observed firing any gun nor was he
present when.. . all the victims were shot." Andrews, 574 P.2d at 709. This aspect of the case
has been among the many subjects of controversy. Mr. Williams's advocates claim that he tried
to dissuade Selby from killing the hostages. Michael Farrell, Andrews Granted Stay of
Execution in Utah, Natl. Catholic Reporter 2 (Sept. 1, 1989). His detractors, on the other hand,
claim he loaned his gun to Selby for the purpose of committing the murders. Paul Schatt,
Browsing Through the News: What Kind of Society Are We Fashioning?, Phoenix Gazette A12
(July 31, 1992).
315. See notes 320-37 and accompanying text.
316. See, for example, Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1357-59 (Maughan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); State v. Andrews, 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 843 P.2d 1027, 1035-41 (1992)
(Durham, J., dissenting). In Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980), Justice Maughan
dissented, arguing that the finality of convictions is an insufficient reason to adhere rigidly to a
restrictive waiver doctrine in death penalty cases. Id. at 825-27 (Maughan, J., dissenting).
Dissenting from a decision not to reach the merits of Mr. Andrews's petition regarding a lesser
included offense instruction, Utah Supreme Court Justice Christine Durham wrote:
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throughout multiple levels of post-trial review3'1 By 1989, one of
Andrews's few hopes for relief was the Utah Board of Pardons and its
commutation power.318  The reality of this "historic remedy for
preventing miscarriages of justice,"' 19 however, failed Andrews as it
fails so many others like him.
There were a number of problems with the process that led to
Andrews's conviction and sentencing. First, his trial lawyer was
inexperienced32 and, although he was not so inept as to be unconsti-
tutionally inadequate,321 he made a number of serious errors. He
failed to call mitigating witnesses, 322 request the inclusion of a lesser
included offense instruction,3 23 challenge important testimony on
recidivism offered at the sentencing phase, 324 object to the racially
based exclusion of a black potential juror,3 25 and object to a jury in-
struction that prejudicially misstated the burden of proof for death
I acknowledge the devastating impact on all concerned of delays required for meticulous
and time-consuming review of the fairness with which the State imposes the death pen-
alty. Balanced against that terrible cost, however, must be the even more terrible pos-
sibility that a defendant's life may be taken without fundamental fairness and due proc-
ess.
Andrews, 773 P.2d at 834 (Durham, J., dissenting).
On one occasion, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Marshall protested the majority's denial of
certiorari, saying that all Andrews sought was an "opportunity to prove actual [racial] bias" at a
hearing. Andrews v. Shulsen, 485 U.S. 919, 921 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
317. See Andrews, 574 P.2d at 710 (incorporating the reasoning adopted in a companion
case, Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1338). Fourteen years later the Tenth Circuit affirmed that Mr.
Andrews had received "full determination" on the merits of these claims. Andrews v. Deland,
943 F.2d 1162, 1174 (10th Cir. 1991).
318. In Utah, the Parole Board has the exclusive authority to grant a commutation. The
governor's power is limited to granting a temporary respite or reprieve. Utah Const. Art. 7, §§
12(2)(a)-(b), 12(3)(a); Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5(1)(a)-(d), -(4) (1995). The Author was a member
of the Utah Parole Board at that time and sat on the three-member panel.
319. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 866 (denying an appeal by a capital convict who murdered a
police officer).
320. Andrews, 943 F.2d at 1197 (McKay, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
321. It was held that the quality of Mr. Andrews's representation was "well within the
range of competent and acceptable defense counsel performance." Id. at 1193-94. Because of
the low standard for adequate attorney conduct and the difficulty of showing prejudice under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the capital defendant is not likely to be able to
demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective.
322. Andrews, 943 F.2d at 1198.
323. Id. at 1169. See also State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) (outlining the
elements where a lesser-included offense instruction is required).
324. Andrews, 942 F.2d at 1169; In the Matter of William Andrews, unpublished opinion of
the Utah State Board of Pardons 8 (no date) (citing Commutation Hearing Transcript 277) (on
file with the Board).
325. Andrews v. Barnes, 779 P.2d 228, 228 (Utah 1989). Exclusion of the black venireman
was noted as part of Justice Marshall's dissent on the broader race issue in 1988. Andrews, 485
U.S. at 920 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.). Andrews's counsel joined in a
challenge for cause against the venireman, additional evidence, argued Mr. Andrews, that
counsel was inadequate.
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penalty sentencing decisions.326  The lawyer's procedural defaults
made a number of trial court errors immune from appellate review.327
Furthermore, the trial court failed to grant an appropriate
change of venue to reduce the influence of the community outrage
over the murders 328 and to sever Andrews's trial from those of his co-
defendants in order to better distinguish the actors' different degrees
of culpability in the minds of the fact finders. 329 While Andrews was
not an innocent man, he did not kill anyone, and was not present
when the killing took place.330
Finally, Andrews's trial was tainted by a racially charged
attempt to prejudice the jury: during a lunch break in the trial, one
juror turned his napkin over to see a stick figure at a gallows and the
words "hang the niggers" written on it. At least two, possibly three,
jurors saw this message, and the napkin was preserved as evidence.331
Andrews's claim that Utah's application of the death penalty
discriminated on the basis of race was never heard because his
submissions were "inadequate to indicate that evidence of
discrimination at his trial would be forthcoming if a hearing were
held."332
Andrews was also denied the benefit of several changes in the
law that came after his conviction. These changes would have re-
quired (1) a higher stand of proof to impose the death penalty,33 (2) a
326. In State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 71 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court adopted a
more stringent standard than was in place for Mr. Andrews's penalty. The following standard
was adopted:
After considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, you must
be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total mitiga-
tion, and you must further be persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the imposition
of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in the circumstances.
Id. (emphasis added).
327. Indeed, the state supreme court refused to consider the issue on its merits because it
said that Andrews did not establish good cause for failing to raise the claim earlier, an error
Andrews said was due to his lawyer's lack of experience. Andrews, 773 P.2d at 832-33.
328. Andrews, unpublished opinion of the Utah State Board of Pardons at 8.
329. Rodd Wagner, Appeals Court Grants Andrews a Stay, Salt Lake Tribune Al (Aug. 20,
1989); State Board Clemency Hearing Separates Andrews From Selby, Salt Lake Tribune A8
(Aug. 14, 1989).
330. The Tenth Circuit considered whether imposition of the death penalty violated the
standards articulated in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (holding that death is too
great a penalty for one who does not intend to participate in or facilitate a murder), and decided
that it did not. Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 1272-74 (10th Cir. 1986).
331. State v. Andrews, 576 P.2d 857, 858-59 (Utah 1978). Thirteen years later the Tenth
Circuit affirmed that Andrews had received "full determination" on the merits of this claim.
Andrews, 943 F.2d at 1174. In a dissent from denial of certiorari, Justice Marshall referred to
the affair as a '"vlgar incident of lynch-mob racism reminiscent of Reconstruction days."
Andrews, 485 U.S. at 922 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
332. Andrews, 802 F.2d at 1266.
333. Wood, 648 P.2d at 71.
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lesser included offense instruction for felony murder,X and (3) the
non-discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to potential jurors.335
Another change added a life without parole penalty to the criminal
code,33 a sentence that could decrease the likelihood of a death sen-
tence by creating an option that would protect the community from
future violence without executing the defendant.37
Andrews, consistent with the Supreme Court's confidence in
the commutation process, raised all of these issues before the Utah
State Board of Pardons. The issues gave the Board the opportunity to
commute Andrews's death penalty to a sentence of life imprisonment,
and subsequently the opportunity to commute to life without parole.331
The Board could have commuted the sentence to correct cumulative
infirmities in the trial that undermined the reliability of both the
conviction and sentencing decisions. It could have done so to promote
systemic values by giving Andrews the benefit of subsequently
created rights. It could have commuted the sentence in order to
promote more appropriate proportionality in sentencing. It could
have commuted the sentence in order to ameliorate the effects of
racism demonstrated by the climate at the time of Andrews's trial,
including the napkin with the hate-filled epithet and the exclusion of
the African-American venireman.339 But Utah, like so many other
states, has placed the commutation power with decision makers who
are subject to strong influences having nothing to do with the merits
of a petition. The Utah Board is not elected. Rather, the paid,
professional board members are appointed by the elected governor,
and though Utah's governor does not possess the power to commute,
334. Andrews, 773 P.2d at 832-33.
335. Andrews, 779 P.2d at 228.
336. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-207, -207.5 (1995).
337. Andrews v. Carver, 798 F. Supp. 659, 661-62 (D. Utah 1992). In her dissent, Justice
Durham wrote, "The majority permits a miscarriage of justice in allowing the state to execute
Andrews in 1992 based upon an eighteen-year-old justification that has now, because of a
change in our law, disappeared." State v. Andrews, 843 P.2d 1027, 1040 (Utah 1992) (Durham,
J., dissenting).
338. When the Board first considered Andrews's petition in 1989, the Utah statute did not
provide a life without parole option. One was adopted before the second consideration of
Andrews's case by the Board. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-207, -207.5 (effective April 27, 1992).
339. Mr. Andrews's case became a cause c~libre in Utah and has drawn the attention of
legal scholars. See, for example, Carol Sisco, Black Leaders Say Racism Abounds In Andrews'
Case, Salt Lake Tribune Al (Aug. 20, 1989); Lisa Carricaburu, Blacks Outraged at Decision,
Ogden Standard-Examiner 1A (Aug. 9, 1989); Jan Thompson, Utah Justice System Is Corrupted
by Prejudice, NAACP Leader Says, Desert News 1A (Aug. 20, 1989); Lisa Curricaburu, NAACP:
We Want Justice, Ogden Standard-Examiner 1A (Aug. 20, 1989); Kevin Reed, Richard Wilson,




his appointment power is a forceful influence on board members.340
The Board denied Andrews's petition by a two-to-one vote,341 and he
was executed by lethal injection on July 30, 1992. For Andrews,
commutation failed to provide a meaningful remedy for the problems
unreachable through post-trial review. Yet this is the process to
which the Supreme Court refers death row inmates for justice.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S COMMUTATION JURISPRUDENCE
It is well established that the administration of criminal
justice, and particularly the death penalty, is filled with infirmities.
There is evidence of a disturbing number of unreliable capital
convictions and sentences,3 2 despite the heightened reliability the
Supreme Court has said is necessary for constitutional imposition of
the death penalty. 43 There is also evidence to believe that many
death sentences have resulted from a process that is unfair.3" No
one's objectives-neither those who favor the death penalty nor those
who oppose it-are served by executing people convicted by an unfair
process, some of whom may be innocent.u 5
Many of the system's flaws are inherent in the task of adjudi-
cating and punishing wrongdoers. Nevertheless, the inevitability of
the errors produced by the system does not obviate the need for a
remedy when injustice results in an individual case. The nation's
340. Governor Norm Bangerter had expressed dissatisfaction some years earlier at the
prospect of commutation of those involved in the events at the Hi-Fi Shop. In a discussion with
the media, the Governor was quoted as saying he would be "very disappointed" if the Board
commuted the sentence of Pierre Dale Selby to life. Brett DelPorto and Jerry Spangler,
Pardons Board Won't Disqualify Itself From Selby Hearing, Deseret News Al (Aug. 8, 1987);
Phil Jensen, Governor Accused of Pressuring Board, Ogden Standard-Examiner Al (July 18,
1987); Karen Kuche, Utah's Governor Can't Commute Selby's Death Sentence, Ogden Standard-
Examiner 1A (Aug. 11, 1987).
341. The Author dissented.
342. Since 1987 seven men have been released from Texas's death row by courts that found
their convictions or sentences "unfounded or unfair." Christy Hoppe, Death Row Appeal Bill
Advances, Dallas Morn. News Al, All (April 11, 1995). Justice Blackmun became convinced
that innocent men are being executed. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1138 n.8 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). See Part II.A.
343. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. See note 9.
344. See Part II.B.
345. Some may argue that the utility of the death penalty as a deterrent is unaffected by
the execution of some innocents. In fact, the deterrent value is undermined in those circum-
stances because it is wrongdoers who must be punished to deter wrongdoing. Furthermore, the




highest court pretends346 that there is an effective safety net that
enables state systems to save the unfairly and wrongfully convicted,
yet there is little evidence that intervention in fact occurs.
This Part identifies four consequences of the Court's fantasy.
First, the Court's view of commutation advances the deregulation of
death. Second, the Court has left the business of commutation to
state systems, but those systems are inherently unable to satisfy the
need to ameliorate injustice. Third, death penalty decisions are
largely decisions without attribution. Because no one feels responsi-
ble for imposing the death penalty, injustices are allowed to go uncor-
rected. Finally, the Court has abdicated its constitutional responsibil-
ity to protect discrete and insular minorities, namely those living on
death rows throughout the thirty-six jurisdictions that have imposed
death sentences.U47
A. Implications of the Deregulation of Death
The deregulation of death has become the hallmark of modern
supreme court death penalty jurisprudence. The Court's denials of
relief have involved cases with merit. For example, Justice Rehnquist
wrote that the claim that executing an innocent person violated the
Eighth Amendment had "elemental appeal.s 48 The Court, professing
that it is justified in denying relief, appears to feel compelled to
assure a justice-seeking audience that there is a way to derail any
injustice produced by its decisions-after all, what if Gary Graham is
innocent?349 Deregulating death requires sufficient finesse to meet
the arguments of those who point out problematic outcomes in death
346. For a more general discussion of judicial veracity, see Martin Shapiro, Judges as
Liars, 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 155 (1994) (arguing that judges consistently lie).
347. See Death Row Reporter at 1 (cited in note 71). New York's newly adopted death
penalty will add to these numbers. See Malcolm Gladwell, After 18 Years, N.Y. Death Penalty
Revived, Wash. Post A15 (March 8, 1995).
348. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 859.
349. Gary Graham, a Texas death row inmate, asserts his innocence based on evidence,
some new, that he says shows that (1) Graham is several inches shorter than the assailant
described by two witnesses, (2) several witnesses failed to identify Graham as the murderer, (3)
the sole witness who identified Graham could not select him from among five photos, but her
testimony alone is the basis for his conviction, (4) two new witnesses have come forward to say
Graham is not the killer they saw, and (5) four people have testified they were elsewhere with
Graham at the time of the murder. David Elliot, Witnesses: Death Row Inmate Too Tall to be
Gunman, Austin American-Statesman B1 (April 21, 1993); Susan Fahlgren, Death Row Inmate
Seeks Pardon, New Trial, Fort Worth Star-Telegram 30 (April 21, 1993). The Court's holding in
Herrera left Graham to look to commutation for relief. For the results of Graham's petition, see
Stephen E. Silverman, Note, There is Nothing Certain Like Death in Texas: State Executive




penalty administration. Without a way to diffuse the criticism of
those who argue that executing Johnny Penry is like executing a nine-
year-old child,351 anti-death penalty sentiment could ascend, thereby
damaging the Court's credibility. The Court's profession of faith in
the commutation fantasy promotes its overall deregulation of death by
assuaging the nay-sayers.
The Court's eagerness to avoid the responsibility for death
penalty policy has become evident. This attitude manifests itself in
language that brims with hostility when the Court confronts the view
that it should provide death penalty oversight. Most recently, Justice
O'Connor wrote that the Court should not engage in "micro-
management" of the death penalty.351 The term calls to mind details,
trivial in nature, and suggests that the business of capital punish-
ment is not worth the bother of national policy making. The Court's
eagerness to avoid providing federal guidance makes oversight by the
states particularly important. State supreme courts have also been
reluctant to undertake oversight of death penalty administration.352
Without state commutation systems that provide meaningful
commutation consideration,353 however, the system's capacity for
providing heightened reliability8- is significantly undermined.
The Court's deregulation of death is premised on federalism,
and in the name of federalism, the Court shows an amazing tolerance
for irregularity, a tolerance boosted by the commutation fantasy.355
One aspect of federalism purports to make decision makers more
accountable by allowing decisions to be made at the state or local
level. The Court is indeed urging that death penalty policy be made
at the state level. Unfortunately, death penalty policy is precisely the
sort of public policy that should not be locally determined. Too often
greater "accountability" simply means that commutation petitions are
denied out of fear of mercurial opinion polls rather than on their
350. In Penry, 492 U.S. at 340, the Court held that mental retardation could be considered
a mitigating factor in the penalty phase of the trial, but that it did not make one per se
ineligible for capital punishment. Evidence was given that Penry's mental age was equivalent
to that of a nine- or ten-year-old child. Id. at 308.
351. Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1036, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1004 (1995).
352. See Alice McGill, Murray v. Giarratano, Right to Counsel in Post-conviction
Proceedings in Death Penalty Cases, 18 Hastings Const. L. Q. 211, 234 (1990) (arguing that state
courts are not doing their share in upholding the constitutional rights of death row inmates).
The states' lack of relish for this task is not surprising given the experience of the California
Supreme Court in 1986. See note 368 and accompanying text.
353. See Daniel T. Kobil, Due Process in Death Penalty Commutations: Life, Liberty, and
the Pursuit of Clemency, 27 U. Richmond L. Rev. 201, 218 (1993).
354. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
355. Franklin E. Zimring, Inheriting the Wind: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment in the 1990's, 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 7, 14 (1992).
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merits. Another aspect of federalism holds that the states are fifty
political and judicial laboratories in which experiments take place.
From the results of these varied experiences we learn better ways to
govern. Experimentation also means failure, however, and those
upon whom the burden of failure falls have no remedy because
meaningful state commutations are a thing of the past.3 6 Because the
Supreme Court's commutation jurisprudence masks this reality, de-
regulation is advanced.
Although some believe that the role of federal courts is to en-
sure that the states administer death penalty practice according to
norms articulated in the Constitution,357 it seems clear that the
Court's commutation jurisprudence is consistent with its refusal to
involve itself in the capital punishment business. It does not see
Furman as having presented a moral directive to articulate standards
for deciding who will be executed. Furthermore, the Court's refusal to
engage in death penalty policy making at the federal level places
responsibility squarely in the hands of the states. The states by and
large have spoken out in favor of finality, state-determined policy, and
speedier execution of death sentences. As the next Section dem-
onstrates, these policy choices do not foster the integrity of death
decisions.
B. Justice the States Cannot Deliver
Having eschewed death penalty policy making, the Supreme
Court now looks to the states to ensure that capital punishment is
justly administered. 358 To the extent that the Court relies on clem-
ency, this is an enterprise that is ill-advised and destined to fail be-
cause popular support for capital punishment is overwhelming, and
current systems provide insufficient insulation between the commuta-
tion decision maker and the electorate.
356. See generally Eric M. Freedman, Innocence, Federalism, and the Capital Jury: Two
Legislative Proposals for Evaluating Post-Trial Evidence of Innocence in Death Penalty Cases, 18
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 315 (1990-91); Jennifer Friesen, Adventures in Federalism: Some
Observations on the Overlapping Spheres of State and Federal Constitutional Law, 3 Widener J.
Pub. L. 25 (1993).
357. Professor Garvey argues that the Supreme Court has delegated norm-selection power
to state courts. It relinquished the power to determine the scope of eighth amendment protec-
tion by a subtle, but significant, modification in the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine.
Stephen P. Garvey, Politicizing Who Dies, 101 Yale L. J. 187, 188 (1991).
358. State courts have shown little enthusiasm for the task. McGill, 18 Hastings Const. L.
Q. at 234 (cited in note 352).
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Part IV.C discussed the difficulty that pro-death-penalty public
sentiment can pose for a governor wishing to commute a death
sentence. Governors' reluctance to commute death sentences is only a
small part of a larger political reality. Other decision makers in the
death penalty process face tremendous political pressure as well.359 In
the end, public support for and widespread politicization of the death
penalty threaten the fairness and reliability of capital sentences.
Surveys show that nearly eighty percent of the American popu-
lation voices support for capital punishment.360 Not surprisingly,
Texans' approval of the death penalty is ninety-two percent, according
to one poll.361 American politicians are likely to follow public opinion,
rather than try to change it.362 No participant in death sentence
decisions is immune from the political pressure that accompanies
those decisions. Almost always, the political winds blow in favor of
execution. While some public officials have been elected despite anti-
death-penalty beliefs, they are the exception rather than the rule.363
The pressure put upon these decision makers begins early in the
process with the prosecutor's initial decision to seek capital pun-
ishment. Since the death penalty is requested in only a small fraction
of all capital murders, this decision is the most critical juncture for
359. Judges, prosecutors, and jurors all face political pressure in death penalty cases. See
Stephen B. Bright and Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between
the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 759, 791 (1995); Barry
C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: The Legislative Changes in
Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 471, 513 (1987); Stanton D. Krauss, The
Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End: Death-qualification Reexamined, 24 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1,
89 (1986).
360. McGill, 18 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 205 (cited in note 352). See The Politics of Death,
Economist 26 (March 24, 1990). Support for the death penalty fluctuates. In 1971 scarcely 49%
favored it. ABC News, Crime and Punishment: The Death House, Nightline 11695D (Jan. 16,
1995) (transcript on file with the Author).
361. James Pinkerton, Crime Poll Finds Many Fear Even a Daytime Walk, Houston
Chronicle A28 (Aug. 7, 1992). One might expect that other felons might exhibit some sympathy
for their counterparts on death row but that is not the case. An investigation of the attitudes of
inmates in four state prisons at all security levels revealed that many believed capital punish-
ment should be used more often to eliminate 'low life" individuals. Dennis J. Stevens, Research
Note: The Death Sentence and Inmate Attitudes, 38 Crime & Delinq. 272, 275 (1992). Violent
offenders appeared to be more adamant in their pro-death-penalty beliefs. Id. at 276. Those
violent offenders who favored the death penalty approved it for others, but not themselves, and
many allowed that it would not deter them personally. Id. at 277.
362. Economist at 26 (cited in note 360).
363. New York Assemblywoman Susan John and Chief Justice Exum of the North Carolina
Supreme Court gave accounts of their campaigns against pro-death-penalty opponents. Both
were successful but spoke of fierce criticism of their anti-death-penalty beliefs during their
campaigns. Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due
Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 Fordham Urban L. J. 239, 265-73 (1994).
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homicide defendants.36 Recent highly publicized cases illustrate that
prosecutors face close public scrutiny while making these decisions
and are often vilified for declining to seek capital punishment.365
Elected judges face the pressure as well. At the ABA
Symposium on politics and the death penalty, Bryan Stevenson,
Executive Director of the Alabama Capital Representation Resource
Center, observed:
Approximately one hundred and twenty people are on death row in the State of
Alabama. Nearly twenty-five percent of those people received life verdicts
from juries.366 When you do a statistical study, a mini-multiple regression
analysis of how the death penalty is applied and how override is applied, there
is a statistically significant correlation between judicial override and election
years in most of the counties where these overrides take place. And it is one of
the clearest examples of the precise dynamic of politics in the administration of
the death penalty.367
State supreme court justices have been replaced because of their view
on the death penalty. Chief Justice Rose Bird and her two liberal
colleagues were voted out of office in 1986, following a period during
which the California Supreme Court had reversed sixty-four of the
sixty-eight capital sentences it had reviewed. The California Supreme
Court now upholds seventy-five percent of the capital sentences it
reviews.368 Candidates for state supreme court justice positions are
keenly aware of the public's strong approval of capital punishment.
In a recent primary campaign, a candidate for the Texas Supreme
Court boasted her enthusiastic support for the death penalty, an odd
"qualification" in light of the fact that the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, and not the Texas Supreme Court, has exclusive jurisdiction
over criminal cases.369
Governors appear to be particularly vulnerable to political
pressure, although New York's former Governor Mario Cuomo man-
364. Sorensen and Marquart, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 743, 750 (cited in note
59).
365. See, for example, Bruce Ledewitz, Cruelly Unusual; If O.J. Simpson Will Not Face the
Death Penalty, Why Should Anyone Else?, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette C3 (Jan. 25, 1995); Scott
Armstrong, Case Against Simpson Intensifies Death Penalty Debate in U.S., Christian Science
Monitor 2 (March 24, 1995); Life Term for Susan Smith Harsher Than Death Penalty, U.S.A.
Today 10A (Jan. 17, 1995); Voices: What Do You Think About Seeking the Death Penalty for
Susan Smith?, U.S.A. Today 8A (Jan. 18, 1995).
366. An Alabama statute permits the judge to override the jury's verdict. Ala. Code § 13A-
5-47 (1994).
367. Symposium, 21 Fordham Urban L. J. at 255-56 (cited in note 363).
368. Economist at 26 (cited in note 360).
369. Bruce Nichols, Court Candidates Trade Charges During Debate, Dallas Morn. News
28A (April 6, 1994).
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aged to "take the moral high ground 3 70 before he was ultimately de-
feated, in part at least, for his anti-death-penalty stance.371  When
Florida's former Governor Bob Graham was running for the United
States Senate, he signed four death warrants between February and
the November election.372 In Governor Bob Martinez's 1989 campaign,
Martinez stated, "I now have signed ninety death warrants in the
state of Florida." 73 During the 1990 election campaigns, gubernato-
rial candidates indulged in what has been called "ghoulish rivalry" in
support of the death penalty.374 California's candidates each vowed to
keep the gas chamber busy. When Texas gubernatorial candidate
Ann Richards received unsolicited support from a prison newspaper,
her rival Jim Mattox adopted the slogan: "Jim Mattox. There are not
endorsements for him on death row."375 In their eagerness to jump on
the death penalty bandwagon, candidates have made absurd claims.
According to Governor Anaya's report, the newly elected New Mexico
governor, Garrey Carruthers, stated publicly that he was eager to
assume office. The first act he would perform, he announced, would
be to sign a death warrant.376 But judges, not governors, sign death
warrants in New Mexico.377
The public's overwhelming approval of capital punishment
affects commutation decision makers with full force because states
provide little or no insulation to buffer clemency officials from public
ire. Although a decision maker in a representative republic should
generally be accountable to citizens, he or she should not be so sensi-
tive to public opinion that paralysis results.378 Perhaps the Supreme
Court recognized the danger of officials' oversubscribing to public
opinion when it suggested that impeachment should be the only check
on their reasons for granting clemency3 79
370. Economist at 26 (cited in note 360).
371. Death-row Inmate Says He's in Charge, Dallas Morn. News 47A (Feb. 19, 1995); News:
Death Penalty, U.SA. Today 3A (Feb. 16, 1995).
372. Symposium, 21 Fordham Urban L. J. at 246 (cited in note 363).
373. Id. at 246 n.28 (citing Richard Cohen, Playing Politics with the Death Penalty, Wash.
Post (March 26-April 1, 1990)).
374. Economist at 26 (cited in note 360).
375. Id.
376. Anaya, 27 U. Richmond L. Rev. at 181 (cited in note 295).
377. N.M. Stat. Ann § 31-41-1 (1993).
378. See, for example, Garvey, 101 Yale L. J. at 208 (cited in note 357) (describing these
concepts as moral proximity and moral independence).
379. See Grossman, 267 U.S. at 121. Tongue in cheek, Bedau has recommended that we
elect more courageous governors, change public opinion so that capital punishment is no longer
tolerated, or "sentence to death offenders that evoke more sympathy than the present lot."
Bedau, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 271 (cited in note 137).
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Unfortunately, an appropriate balance has not been struck in
capital clemency decision making. A governor who wields the commu-
tation power alone or shares it with others faces re-election periodi-
cally. Board members who have the power to grant clemency eventu-
ally face reappointment by an elected governor. No matter how much
merit these officials see in a case, the fallout of a commutation could
be fearsome, or even politically fatal. By ignoring the political
pressure against commutations and by pretending commutation
authorities are free to grant clemency in meritorious cases, the
Supreme Court obscures the reality of commutation practice and
promotes the fantasy of the commutation ideal. As long as that is the
case, state commutation decision making will continue to be the slave
of public opinion and an empty promise to death row inmates seeking
justice.
C. Responsibility for Death Penalty Decisions
Who decides who dies? The Court's commutation jurispru-
dence contributes to a disturbing phenomenon. Modern death penalty
practice diffuses responsibility among multiple actors, each of whom
legitimizes the decision of the actor preceding it, until responsibility
never really settles anywhere, and no one actually appears to do the
killing.380
On a macro level, it is the electorate who is responsible for the
death penalty, though, of course, the voters do not decide which of-
fenders will receive it and which will not. The decision to impose the
death penalty is a collective judgment read from ballots according to
the choices voters make about candidates' positions on crime and
capital punishment (as well as other issues). An odd thing about
collective decisions, however, is that sharing responsibility enables
some to do what they would otherwise not do alone.m1 The actor feels
less responsible if the decision turns out to be wrong, because so many
others share his or her view. If he or she did not vote for the pro-
death-penalty candidate, the reasoning goes, many others would have.
380. Garvey, 101 Yale L. J. at 187 (cited in note 357) (citing Jason DeParle, Louisiana
Diarist: Killing Folks, 190 New Republic 43 (Jan. 30, 1984)). While covering an execution in
Louisiana, DeParle observed that "the strange thing about executions is that nobody actually
seems to do the killing." He wondered whether the offender was to be killed by the jury that
convicted him, the judge that sentenced him, or the governor who signed the death warrant. Id.
381. See Stanley Milgram, The Individual in a Social World: Essays and Experiments 220-
21 (McGraw-Hill, 2nd ed. 1992); Bibb Latan6 and John M. Darley, The Unresponsive Bystander:
Why Doesn't He Help? 90 (Appleton-Century Crofts, 1970).
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It is unlikely that any of the hundreds of thousands of voters who
support candidates with pro-death-penalty views feels personally
responsible for the death penalty in that state. Because it is impossi-
ble for an individual acting alone to be responsible for establishing
and maintaining capital punishment, ownership for capital punish-
ment remains widely diffused. Citizens, in whose name the death
penalty is carried out, have delegated that task to public officials.
Consider next, in the quest for who decides who dies, the pub-
lic official who drafts, proposes and does all that is necessary in the
labyrinth of the legislature to bring about the death penalty. It is the
legislator who hears victims and their families, reads letters to the
editor and editorials, and tries to assess the sentiment among his or
her constituents. In this tug-of-war for the legislator's vote on the
floor, popular support in favor of the death penalty overwhelms
whatever arguments might be put forth on behalf of offenders who, as
Bedau pointed out, are not a very sympathetic lot.382 And again, there
is that shared responsibility that diffuses personal ownership.
The prosecutor is another actor who decides who lives or dies.
He or she is, after all, the first one in the system to connect the death
penalty with a particular criminal actor. It is the prosecutor's
decision that determines whether a particular defendant ever faces
the prospect of being sentenced to death. Guidance for this decision
comes from the statute fashioned by the legislature. Within the con-
fines of that statute, the prosecutor still exercises tremendous
discretion. The task is to do justice, but what justice is may well be
determined by the political structure under which the prosecutor
toils. Re-election of the boss, the county or district attorney, may
nudge the prosecutor toward seeking the death penalty. The ultimate
decision is made to conform to the county attorney's policy, which is
intended to please voters. Thus, the prosecutor can place some of the
responsibility for that decision on the shoulders of another.
Probably the most visible decision makers are the jurors and
the judges who decide to impose death rather than life at the sentenc-
ing stage of a defendant's trial. There are decisions prior to and after
that moment, however, without which the execution would not take
place. Juries and judges know that the system was designed by
382. Indeed, some suggest it is populist support. Hugo Adam Bedau, American Populism
and the Death Penalty: Witnesses at an Execution, 33 Howard J. Grim. Just. 289 (1994). "[The
death penalty is increasingly not only a popular but a populist practice in America. No wonder
politicians run scared before the electorate on this issue, rarely commuting a death sentence,
rarely vetoing new death penalty legislation, rarely introducing bills to reduce or abolish the
death penalty." Id. at 300.
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others and that there will be a review of their decisions. If mistakes
happen, they will be corrected by others. 33 Judges have no one with
whom to share responsibility for imposing a death penalty, but they
may see themselves as acting on behalf of the people, or, less
admirably, they may act to ensure retention or re-election. Juries do
not have to face election, but they divide their responsibility among
the group.
Appellate courts review convictions and sentences to ensure
their integrity. They make their judgments with the knowledge that
defendants have enjoyed "super due process" at trial and that others
will review what they have reviewed. The farther the case proceeds
through the system, the less likely it is that the conviction or sentence
will be reversed.8 This is in part because errors have been weeded
out, but it is also because the conviction and sentence become self-
validated as they proceed.38 5
Commutation is the last resort for the condemned prisoner. It
is here where the strength of the many previous affirmations of the
conviction and sentence weighs most heavily. A nearly irrebuttable
presumption of validity exists. Because it is unthinkable that a meri-
torious claim could have gone unrecognized during the course of many
appellate and habeas corpus proceedings, governors and boards are
loath to commute a sentence. Commutation decision makers, then,
take their place among the many others who had nothing to do with
the execution of a person whose conviction and sentence may have
been seriously flawed.
Ironically, it is the person who actually shoots the bullet or
pulls the switch that has the last responsibility of all the actors in the
capital punishment drama-yet we protect the executioners from
guilt. We protect the person on the firing squad by loading one rifle
with a blank and the others by screening from their view the graphic
results of their handiwork.3 6
The capital punishment process is a nameless, faceless ma-
chine. It is made up of multiple actors, none of whom bears the undi-
vided responsibility for a given death sentence. Moral labor so di-
383. "Finally, [the state] argues that any error in the imposition of the death penalty by the
jury can be cured by the judge after a hearing on the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances." Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980) (holding unconstitutional a death sentence
imposed after a jury verdict where the jury was not permitted to consider a lesser included
offense).
384. "The possibility that [habeas corpus] claims [have] merit [grows] increasingly remote
as the process [is] repeated." Jeffries, Powell at 444 (cited in note 102).
385. Id.
386. Robert Johnson, Death Work 21 (Brooks-Cole, 1990).
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vided encourages those who act first to believe those who follow will
correct errors. It persuades the final actors that the hard work and
deliberations of previous actors produced a reliable conviction and
sentence that ought not to be disturbed.38 7 A bureaucracy in which no
one appears to make decisions may produce the least humane
decisions.388 Instead of providing the buck-stops-here fail-safe
measure, commutation procedures merely add another layer to the
bureaucracy that frustrates those who seek justice.389
D. Abdication of the Court's Role as Protector of the Powerless
A related concern raised by the Supreme Court's commutation
jurisprudence and its tendency to promote deregulation is the appar-
ent abdication of the Court's responsibility to protect the powerless.
The Supreme Court has traditionally been seen as the protector of
those who cannot protect themselves in a pluralistic political proc-
ess.390 The justices' independence from political pressure allows the
Court to act in a countermajoritarian way.391 The notion that the
Court is a protector of minorities was laid down in footnote four of
United States v. Carolene Products Co.,392 and has engendered
substantial controversy. 93
That minorities need protection in the ordinary course of a
representative democracy is demonstrated by public choice theory,
which holds that public officials act in their own self interest and
that "an overwhelming preponderance of political incentives favor
unrestricted enforcement of criminal law" by whatever means, legiti-
387. Garvey, 101 Yale L. J. at 187 (cited in note 359). See also Cobb, 99 Yale L. J. at 404
(cited in note 68).
388. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 45 (U. Chicago, 1958) (noting that in modem
society action is eventually replaced by bureaucracy--"the rule of nobody").
389. A commentator in a recent television program on the death penalty observed,
"Apparently, the more that we, as a nation, support the death penalty, the less interested we
are in those who are executed in our name." ABC News, Nightline at 11695D (cited in note
360).
390. See, for example, Elizabeth Hull, Undocumented Alien Children and Free Public
Education: An Analysis ofPlyler v. Doe, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 430 (1983).
391. Note, Race for Justice, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 2015, 2016 (1993).
392. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Carolene Products is widely viewed as the font of the
notion that the Supreme Court is willing to protect "discrete and insular minorities" from the
excesses of the political process. See, for example, Daniel A- Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Is
Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights
Legislation, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 685, 689-716 (1991) (arguing that the footnote-four model ofjudicial
review must be preserved in light of modern political realities).
393. Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice; or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 Syracuse
L. Rev. 1079 (1993).
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mate or illegitimate. 394 Likely, it was the tyranny of public opinion
that induced the Court to invoke the Eighth Amendment and
"withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of public controversy,
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to es-
tablish them as legal principles to be applied by the court."395
Regrettably, say some, the Supreme Court has done little to
place capital punishment "beyond the reach of majorities." Justice
Thurgood Marshall condemned the Court for having become "an ac-
cessory to the perpetuation of racial discrimination. ' 39 The Court's
modern commutation jurisprudence supports this view. People on
death row are disproportionately black and overwhelmingly poor. 97
What little power members of these groups have diminishes upon
arrest and disappears upon conviction. An innocent or unfairly con-
victed inmate on death row has little political currency available to
correct his plight. At the same time, crime is at the top of the list of
public concerns. With public controversy at its peak, fairness in the
process is subordinated in favor of law-and-order rhetoric. The Court
declines to provide death row inmates with a remedy and instead
refers them to a farcical commutation process. In doing so, it closes
the door on those without the power to challenge their convictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Wrongful convictions, unfair distribution of the death penalty,
and a restricted review of death sentences reaffirm the need for a
mechanism to provide a remedy for those who are innocent, and those
whose proceedings, though constitutional, were seriously flawed. This
is particularly true where certain arguments never found a forum.
According to the literature on commutations and the Supreme Court's
clemency jurisprudence, commutation should be the ideal mechanism
for ensuring justice because a power so broad could be used for many
394. Id. at 1081.
395. See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
396. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 466 U.S. 55, 141 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
Girardeau A. Spann, Race Against the Court: The Supreme Court and Minorities in
Contemporary America (N.Y.U., 1993).
397. See Michael Echevarria, Reflections on O.J. and the Gas Chamber, 32 San Diego L.
Rev. 491 (1995); Bryan K. Fair, Using Parrots to Kill Mockingbirds: Yet Another Racial
Prosecution and Wrongful Conviction in Maycomb, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 403, 422 (1994); Floyd D.
Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of the Justice System on the Status of African-American
Males: An Overview Perspective, 23 Capital U. L. Rev. 23, 47 (1994); Jack Healey, You Can
Make a Difference, 34 Howard L. J. 82, 83 (1991).
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justice-enhancing reasons. The Court's decisions demonstrate further
that it assumes that commutation currently operates as the idealized
process for enhancing justice. In fact, commutation does not so oper-
ate because strong pro-death-penalty public opinion stands in the way
and states have not provided insulation from public opinion for
commutation decision makers.
Unfortunately, the rosy but inaccurate picture painted by the
Court has these deleterious effects: (1) by failing to acknowledge that
its decisions can leave petitioners without a remedy, the Court quells
legitimate criticism of its actions and proceeds apace with the deregu-
lation of death, (2) the Court's obscured reality maintains the tie
between commutation decisions and popular opinion via the political
process and therefore the states do not provide the hoped for fail-safe
mechanism, (3) a non-functioning commutation process does harm
because it contributes another bureaucratic layer to insulate those
who so strongly support the death penalty from responsibility for all
of its consequences, and finally (4) by maintaining the fiction of ideal-
ized commutation, the Court adds to the growing evidence that it has
abandoned its role as protector of the politically powerless by refusing
to prevent an execution. One undertaking of this Article has been to
inform the emperors that they have no clothes.398 The Court's stated
reliance on commutation is a smoke screen that draws attention from
the consequences of its refusal to regulate the death penalty.
The message having been delivered to the emperors, what can
be done about miscarriages of justice in light of the Court's position? I
add my voice to those of others who have suggested that commutation
can be revived.399 It can be reinstituted to some degree by insulating
decision makers from the political consequences of granting commuta-
tion in an unpopular case. Only then can decision makers render
judgments based more on the merits and less on political pressure.
This Article argues that the traditional governor-appointed
board is an insufficient buffer against strong public opinion. Better
protection against public opinion can be provided if the governor
398. I follow the time-honored tradition of using Hans Christian Andersen's story to criti-
cize disingenuous failure to provide adequate remedies. See Richard Klein, The Emperor
Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance
of Counsel, 13 Hastings Const. L. Q. 625, 672 (1986); Stefan H. Krieger, An Advocacy Model for
Representation of Low-income Intervenors in State Public Utility Proceedings, 22 Ariz. St. L. J.
639 (1990).
399. See, for example, Kobil, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 633-36 (cited in note 4).
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appoints a selection board,400 comprised primarily of unpaid citizens,
which would then appoint the commutation authority. The selection
board would follow statutory qualifications and other selection factors
to ensure balanced representation on the clemency board. For exam-
ple, candidates for the clemency board should have to meet qualifica-
tions relating to education and experience. Additionally, the number
of appointments from a single political party should be limited, and
representation by a variety of races and genders should be encour-
aged. Although the governor would still appoint the selection board,
the collectiveness of that board's appointment decisions would make
each individual less vulnerable to retaliation and political pressure.
Further, the commutation decision itself would be made by the clem-
ency board, which would be sufficiently far removed from the gover-
nor to attenuate his or her possible influence.
The strengths of a citizen selection board are its independence
from state criminal justice agencies, its ability to reflect public senti-
ment in a tempered fashion, and its potential for attracting useful
expertise to the problems of criminal justice policy. Its shortcoming is
that its members may lack insight into the ongoing, every-day prob-
lems of criminal justice administration. For this reason, a minority of
the selection board should include criminal justice professionals such
as judges, correctional administrators, and parole board members.
Unfortunately, the dearth of information about commutation
decisions leaves the would-be architect of change with little guidance.
There is, for example, no collection and analysis of state death penalty
commutation practices. Such a study could suggest more effective
ways to insulate clemency boards from public influence and could
provide insight into more appropriate standards of conduct for them.
Research is needed in other areas as well. For example, instances of
granted death penalty commutations have been identified and
counted, but information about differences between the merits of
commutations granted and commutations denied is not available,
aside from some dated, anecdotal works. Inquiry into how jurors' ex-
pectations that clemency will be granted actually influence conviction
rates is also warranted.
When justices of the Supreme Court have uttered phrases such
as "heightened reliability" and "death is different," they acknowledge
the truly awesome nature of the death penalty. With the decline in
400. This discussion presumes that the commutation power should not be exercised by a
single individual (and, least of all, by an elected one). Group decisions distribute the political
heat among several people, making it somewhat more endurable.
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the use of the commutation power, we have lost an important means
of ensuring that executions occur only when the process and its
outcome are fair.
